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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays about heterogeneous agents in the dy-
namic economy and how to deal with the asymmetric information arose by hetero-
geneity.
Firstly, I consider the optimal taxation issue in a dynamic endogenous growth
model with considering human capital accumulation, and agents ability is heteroge-
neous and private information. Moreover, the agents with higher ability have positive
external effects on others. By using the two-sector endogenous model, I show that
it is optimal to impose different income and capital income taxes on people with
different abilities. Specifically, positive marginal income tax is adopted for people
with lower ability while no tax is imposed for people with higher ability; marginal
capital income tax is zero whatever the agent’s is low or high. As for people using the
capital and labor for human capital accumulation, the government should subsidize
them whatever their ability is.
Secondly, I study the optimal monetary and fiscal policy with heterogeneous
agents based on the search-theoretical environment where money is essential and
consider the private information. I first solve the households’ problem in the central-
ized and decentralized market, and find out the optimal conditions. Then, in this
section, I describe the problem that social planner faces by involving uncertainty
and agents whose types are continuous. By comparing the optimal conditions in this
generous setting, I show that the Friedman rule is no longer optimal when jointed
with nonlinear taxation of income. Moreover, the capital income taxation is not zero.
Moreover, I constructs a general theoretical model to consider two kinds of finan-
cial frictions in the economy with financial intermediaries. By quantitative analysis
ii
the model with three separate shocks which are a negative collateral shock, a neg-
ative productivity shock and a positive shock to bankers’ divert rate, I find that a
negative collateral shock which tightens firms’ financing constraints on investment
can generate an equity price boom which is different from what is observed in reces-
sions. Therefore, the collateral shock is not the main reason for the business cycle,
while the negative productivity shock and bankers’ moral hazard problem are more
important aspects to explain current economy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Lucas [66] points out that for all practical purposes, in fact, the central prob-
lem of depression prevention for macroeconomics has already been solved for many
decades. However, right now, better policies provide people with more incentive to
work which leads to great gains in welfare. By introducing heterogeneity in the dy-
namic economy, my research has focused on studying various issues in optimal fiscal
and monetary policy using the dynamic Mirrlees framework, building on Golosov,
Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski [44], and Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning[47]. An im-
portant idea articulated in this approach is that as heterogeneity matters the econ-
omy, it is reasonable to consider optimal monetary policy and fiscal policy together
in the environment with heterogeneous agents instead of the one with homogeneous
representative agents. The main objective of my research is trying to find out the
optimal trade-off between incentive and insurance. On one hand, we need to consider
how to supply the right insurance against bad shocks for those agents with low skills,
on the other hand, we need to provide incentives for those agents with high skills to
tell the truth.
In Section 2, I consider the optimal non-linear taxation issues in a limited hori-
zon dynamic economy with human capital accumulation, where agents’ ability is
heterogeneous and private information. Moreover, the agents with higher ability
have positive external effects on others. By using a two-sector endogenous growth
model, this paper finds out that it is optimal to impose different income and capital
income taxes on people with different abilities. Specifically, positive marginal income
tax is adopted for people with lower ability while no tax is imposed for people with
higher ability; marginal capital income tax is zero whatever the agent is low ability
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person or not. Furthermore, if people use the capital and labor for human capital
accumulation, the government should subsidize both them whatever is the agent’s
ability, which is consistent with Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan [69]’s statement.
Based on this, I have gone one step further. Since the fiscal pressure can have
important consequences for monetary policy, specifically, the source of fiscal pressure
on monetary policy is the consolidated fiscal-monetary budget constraint, it is neces-
sary to consider the monetary policy and fiscal policy together. The Section 3 seeks
to build models that contain many of the feature commonly used in the macroeco-
nomic models and supply the micro-foundations of money demand. Previous papers
consider optimal fiscal policy in an economy without involving money, or discuss
optimal monetary policy with homogeneous agents in reduced-form approaches such
as money-in-utility model and cash-in-advance model. Different from them, in this
section, I study the optimal monetary and fiscal policy with heterogeneous agents
other than homogeneous agents. In the economy, as there exists friction to value
money, making money essential can expand the set of feasible trades. Based on the
search-theoretical environment such as Lagos and Wright [64] and Williamson and
Wright [87], I first solve the households’ problem in the centralized and decentral-
ized market, and find out the optimal conditions. Then, the section describes the
problem that social planner faces by involving uncertainty and heterogeneous agents
whose types are continuous. While the households in the economy are heterogeneity
in skills which are private information and always changing over time, this section
develops a complete description of the optimal allocations in this economy. In order
to classify different kinds of agents, we need to consider a large number of incentive
constraints, which would lead us to reconsider the optimal monetary and fiscal policy
under these settings. By comparing the optimal conditions in this generous setting,
I show that the Friedman rule is not optimal when jointed with nonlinear taxation
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of income. Moreover, the capital income taxation is not zero.
Since financial sectors are playing more and more important role in modern
economies, following the Great Depression, economists such as Fisher [35] and Keynes
[55] have pointed out that the failure of financial markets would result in the eco-
nomic downturn. In many standard macroeconomic models, identical households
can invest in non-financial firms directly, without using financial sectors. As stated
in Brunnermeier and Sannikov [16], this approach can only yield realistic macroeco-
nomic predictions if, in reality, there are no frictions in the economy. However, The
current financial crisis starting in August 2007 has underscored and reminded us once
again of the importance of financial intermediaries and financial market frictions for
the business cycles.
In the last section, I construct a general theoretical model to consider two kinds of
financial frictions in the economy with financial intermediaries. One is the classical
principal-agency problem between financial intermediaries and households, which
will limit the bankers’ ability to obtain deposits without constraints by borrowing
extra funds from households. The other financial friction is a collateral constraint
when firms borrow external funds from banks. By formulating households, bankers
and entrepreneurs’ decisions in a monetary DSGE framework with nominal rigidities
and determining the competitive equilibrium, this model supplies the environment
that we can simulate the production shocks and liquidity shocks which can be used to
analysis the effects of monetary policies. By calibrating the model with three separate
shocks which are a negative collateral shock, a negative productivity shock and a
positive shock to bankers’ divert rate, this paper finds that a negative collateral shock
which tightens firms’ financing constraints on investment can generate an equity price
boom which is different from what is observed in recessions. Therefore, a collateral
shock is not the primary driving power of these business cycles, while a negative
3
productivity shock and bankers’ moral hazard problem are more important aspects
to explain current economy. Moreover, it provides a caution for policy makers:
they should find the reasons of the shortfall in liquidity other than simply pumping
liquidity into the market.
4
2. HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, POSITIVE EXTERNALITY AND
OPTIMAL TAXATION
Lucas [67] has pointed out that the sources of the present economic world can be
treated partially as a result of accumulation in physical and human capital, especially
during the process of transiting from a agricultural society to a society of industrial-
ization. Retrospecting the history of economic development, we could found out the
following facts: the process of industrialization is accompanied with urbanization.
During the proceeding, the rate of population living in cities is increasing and the
share of the workforce in agriculture is decreasing dramatically. In 1850, the farmers
made up 64% of labor force in United States, and the proportion fell to 38% in 1900,
to 12.2% in 1950, and then to 3.6% in 1980, while the similar story also happened
in Britain.
As we could see from the Table A.1, when the economy took off during the periods,
accordingly, the share of rural population in that country declined significantly. In
South Korea, as a typical example of Newly Industrial Economics (NIEs), the growth
rate maintained exceptionally high between the early 1960s and 1990s, meanwhile,
the share of rural population fell from 72.3% in 1960 to 20.4% in 2000. During
the last twenty years of the twentieth century, some Asian countries have achieved
great progress in economic development, such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Philippines, the shares of rural population also decreased remarkably. Since China
started the Reform and Open policy in the end of 1970s, the rate of rural population
has been declined from 80.4% in 1980 to 56.9% in 2008, as a country with over one
billion people, there are millions of people crowd into the cities and adapt to the new
life there. Just shown in the Table A.1, Argentina and Brazil have been undergoing
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the similar transitions between 1960 and 2008.
Without double, physical capital accumulation is the crucial element to determine
the growth rate of the economy especially during the period of industrial revolution.
As for human capital, as Galor and Moav [38] point out human capital accumulation
has replaced the physical accumulation as a driving force of economic development
during the transition from the Industrial Revolution to current growth. Since labor’s
ability is the vital point which influences the speed of transition, the labor forces
from rural areas have the incentive to invest their resources to improve their personal
ability which will increase the intensity of competition in the cities. Accordingly, the
original skilled workers, in the urban areas, need to increase their investment in order
to enhance their skill levels, which would creates benefit for other agents from the
rural areas 1.
Since human capital’s effect on aggregate output is extremely important not only
for policymakers but also for economists, and while taxation policies are important
instruments for government to improve the economic efficiency and social equity,
especially when individuals ability is heterogeneous and private information, it is
meaningful to consider how to constitute proper public policies to accelerate human
capital and substance capital accumulation with regarding the distortion.
There are two different approaches in considering the optimal taxation. Starting
from Ramsey [76], it studied the problem of choosing an optimal linear tax system
in an economy with homogeneous agents when lump-sum taxation is not available.
By giving the set of tax instruments, this approach has the conclusion that as for
the taxation on commodities, the proportionate taxes should lead the production
of each taxed commodity to decrease the same proportion. Following the Ramsey’s
1Acemoglu [1] has emphasized the importance of this kind of human capital accumulation em-
pirically.
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work, Atkinson and Stiglitz [8] points out that if the utility function is separable
and homothetic, the taxation on commodity should be uniform, which means that
the optimal taxes across consumption goods are the same. Moreover, Atkinson and
Stiglitz [9] and [7] states that tax rates depend on income elasticities, with necessities
taxed more than luxuries. The familiar intuition from partial equilibrium that goods
with low price elasticities should be taxed heavily does not necessarily apply in a
general equilibrium setting. As for the intermediate goods, the taxes on them should
be zero, and there are taxes only on final goods (Chari and Keheo[20]). In these
papers, the only inputs for goods production is labor and do not need capital and
technology.
As considering the taxing capital income, in a neoclassical model with individuals
who are living infinitely, Judd [60] and Chamley [18] state that the capital income
could tax at initially high rates, while in the long run, the taxing rates should drop
to zero. Here, in view of the capital’s significance for goods production, they made
the above conclusion and did not consider the capital was also important for human
capital production. Based on Chamley-Judd result, Jones, Manuelli and Rossi [50]
show that in the long run, the human capital’s return ought not to be taxed. However,
in this model, it did not consider the situation with heterogeneous agents, and made
the conclusion about the optimal capital income tax when their ability was uncertain
in the future.
Different from Ramsey approach, the Mirrlees approach of optimal taxation is set
up on a totally different background. The central problem of the Mirrlees approach
is trying to find the optimal trade-off between incentive and insurance. On one hand,
we need to consider how to supply the right insurance against bad shocks for those
agents with low skills, on the other hand, we need to provide incentives for the agents
with high skills to tell the truth. The vital conclusion is that the margin between
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consumption and leisure for agents with the highest skill is not distorted (Mirrlees
[71],Diamond and Mirrlees[28] [29]).
In recent years, beginning with Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski [44] and
Werning [86], lots of literature applies the Mirrlees [71] set-up to dynamic environ-
ments which is more perplexed than implementation of either Ramsey models or
static Mirrlees models(Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning [47]). In Golosov, Kocher-
lakota and Tsyvinski [44] and Kocherlakota [61], they study the optimal taxation
problems in the economy where individual skills are their own private information
and change randomly over time. If the preferences are additive separability between
labor and consumption, they have the different conclusion that generally, even though
the uniform commodity taxation theorem still holds, the capital income taxation is
not zero. Depending on the above study, Golosov and Tsyvinski [45] suggest an asset-
tested disability program to implement the optimum allocation. In this program, the
disability insurance can be achieved, and meanwhile, it is also accomplished through
a direct mechanism that joins with the wealth and income tax system. Moreover,
this paper also proved that when agents are heterogeneous and market is incomplete,
the linear taxation in Ramsey model is not the Pareto tax.
In the above series of papers, they assumed that the agents’ ability was het-
erogeneous and unobservable, while they did not consider the knowledge spillovers
between different kinds of people. Obviously, the people with high ability have pos-
itive external effect on the people with low ability. Meanwhile, they did not take
the human capital accumulation into account, or just considered the time was the
only input for human capital accumulation, without taking into account the physical
capital’s role in the process of human capital accumulation.
In this section, I consider the optimal taxation with the dynamic Mirrlees models
in the neoclassical economics. The basic assumptions are as follows: there exist
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heterogeneous agents with private information about their personal abilities. But
differ from the above dynamic model with regarding the human capital accumulation.
In the paper Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski [44], they assume the agents’s skill
levels which could be regarded as human capital are heterogeneous and independent
to each other, and agents could use their capital and time to improve their human
capital. Besides, the agents’ skill level are interaction other than independent. As
we know, production can be given a spatial dimension by postulation a production
externality that makes any individual more productive if other productive people are
nearby. Eaton and Eckstein [31] point out that the externality affects the technology
used for human capital accumulation other than the technology used for producing
final goods. Thus, I use the two-sector economy in Rebelo [78] and Jones, Maneulli
and Rossi [51][50] with regarding knowledge spillovers.
The rest of the section is organized as follows: In the section 2, I state the
assumptions in the paper. Then, I adopt the three-period model to work out the
conditions for first best allocation when the information is complete. In the section 4,
when the information is incomplete, I get the conditions for second best allocation. In
the section 5, I have the conclusions about optimal taxation in the discrete economy.
2.1 The Model
The basic environment is similar to Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning [47], Costa
and Maestri[24] and Bohacek and Kapicka[14]. The main difference is that there
exists knowledge spillover effect between different kinds of agents, and in order to
improve the personal ability, they also need to input physical capital besides the
time. The reason of these assumptions is to emphases the externality of the human
capital accumulation and the physical capital’s importance in the process of produc-
ing the final goods and increasing their skill levels.
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In the economy, there exists two kinds of people and the only difference between
them is their personal ability denoted by θi, θH > θh, θi ∈ R++, here, the θi is exoge-
nous, unobservable and unchangeable. Furthermore, we could regard the difference
of ability is decided by nature such as the intelligence.
Just as stated in Rebelo [78] and Jones, Maneulli and Rossi [51][50] , throughout
the paper I consider two-sector economy: one sector is specialized in producing the
final production and the other sector only accumulates the human capital. Although
they have different production function, both of them need input physical capital
and labor. Moreover, the consumption market is perfect competitive.
Everyone has one unit endowment of time, which uses for leisure Lt, producing
physical goods lt and human capital accumulation Nt, obviously, there exists Lt =
1−Nt − lt and lt, Nt ∈ (0, 1).
2.1.1 Preferences
Each agent lives for three periods, which just like life cycle, in the first period,
both types of agents have the same human capital level; in the second period, as
agetns’ learning ability is different across agents, they will have the different human
capital level, and the externality will happen during this period; in the last period,
they will allocate any resource in physical and human capital accumulation since they
would like to use all their income for consumption. Meanwhile, their preferences are
the same which can be represented as follows:
3∑
t=0
βtU(ct, Lt), (2.1)
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where β ∈ (0, 1), the utility function U is continuous differential and satisfies Uc > 0,
UL > 0, Ucc < 0, ULL < 0 and Inada conditions. According to Atkinson and Stiglitz
[8][7], it is normal to assume the utility function is separable between consumption
and leisure, which means UcL = 0, and we can rewrite the instantaneous utility
function as U(ct, Lt) = u(ct) + v(1−Nt − lt).
2.1.2 Production Function
Before we describe the productive function, we need to know the concept of
efficient labor. Just as in Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski[44]Kapicka[54] and
Kocherlakota[61] [62], the efficient labor is:
y = HN,
where H denotes the human capital and N is the agent’s real labor input which are
both unobservable, which Efficient labor y can be observed.
In period t, the human capital accumulation depends on the agent’s personal
ability, time spending and physical capital. The law of motion equation for high
ability agents’ human capital can be written as:
HH,t+1 = G(θH , xHt, y
H
Ht) + (1− δH)HHt, (2.2)
where effective labor yHHt = HHtNHt, NHt ∈ (0, 1) is the amount of agent’s real labor
used in accumulating human capital, xHt is the physical capital input, δH ∈ (0, 1)
is the discount rate of human capital. As in traditional, the production function
G(θH , xHt, y
H
Ht) is strictly increasing and concave.
With regarding knowledge spillovers, just as in Eaton and Eckstein [31], Lucas
[67], in the proceeding of human capital accumulation, as a result of the difference
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among agents, the levels of human capital would be diversified. More importantly,
the agents with high ability will have positive external effect on people with low
ability, and the law of motion equation for low ability agents’ human capital can be
written as:
Hh,t+1 = (
HHt
Hht
)δG(θh, xht, y
H
ht) + (1− δH)Hht, (2.3)
here, δ > 0, xht denotes the low ability people’s physical capital input, y
H
ht is the
effective labor input.
In period t, the agent i’s productive function of final goods is:
Yi(t) = F (Kit, y
l
it), (2.4)
where effective labor ylit = Hitlit, lit is the agent’s labor input in producing final
goods; Kit is the agent’s physical capital and the law of motion is:
Ki,t+1 = Iit + (1− δk)Kit, (2.5)
here Iit is agent i’s physical capital investment, δk is the capital discount rate.
Especially, just as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin [11], there exists different density in
using physical capital and labor between the productive functions of final goods and
human capital. Obviously, the productive function of final goods is relative density
in using physical capital while the function of human capital is relative density in
using labor.
2.1.3 Taxation Policy
As in the Mirrlees private information framework, the taxation policy is the func-
tion of observed variables, which means that taxation rate depends on the individual’s
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labor income and capital income2, thus the taxation:
Tt = T (y
H
t , y
l
t, xt, It) (2.6)
In every period, the government uses the tax income to keep balance, which can be
indicated by the resource constraints and the individuals’ budget constraints.
2.2 First Best Allocation
The economy lasts for 3 periods. Initially, the agents with different ability have
the same human capital and physical capital, according to their difference in ability,
their human capital will diversify in the next period.
Firstly, we discuss the optimal allocation when information is perfect and govern-
ment knows their personal ability. The object of this section is to supply a benchmark
so that it can be used to compared with the results in other sections.
The social planner characterizes optimal allocation {cit, Nit, lit, xit, Iit}i=H,h by
solving the following problem:
max
{cit,Nit,lit,xit,Iit}
∑
i=H,h
(
2∑
t=1
βt−1U(cit, 1−Nit − llit) + β2U(ci3, 1− li3). (2.7)
In the first best allocation, the constraints for social planner are just the feasible
conditions in every period. In period one, the feasible condition for government is
∑
i=H,h
(ci1 + xi1 + Ii1) + g1 =
∑
i=H,h
F (Ki1,, Hi1li1). (2.8)
2Since the labor and capital market are competitive, wage and rental rates are given. Therefore,
we can rate the taxation policy as a function depends on efficient labor and capital level.
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In period two,
∑
i=H,h
(ci2 + xi2 + Ii2) + g2 =
∑
i=H,h
F (Ki2, Hi2li2). (2.9)
Here, Hi2 = G(θi, xi1 + Hi1Hi1) + (1 − δi)Hi1, and Ki2 = (1 − δk)Ki1 + Ii1, where
i = H, h. In period three,
∑
i=H,h
ci3 + g3 =
∑
i=H,h
F (Ki3, Hi3li3). (2.10)
Here, the physical capital Ki3 = (1 − δk)Ki2 + Ii2; the human capital of agent with
high ability is HH3 = G(θH , xH2NH2) + (1− δH)HH2.
With considering the knowledge spillovers, the human capital of agent with low
ability is Hh3 = (
HH2
Hh2
)δG(θh, xh2, Hh2Nh2) + (1− δh)Hh2.
It is easy to solve the problem (2.7) under the constraints of (2.8) (2.9) (2.10),
and get the first order conditions as follows:
As for the consumptions in each period,
∂U(cHt, LHt)
∂LHt
=
∂U(cht, Lht)
∂Lht
(2.11)
Here, t = 1, 2, 3. If UcL = 0, equation (2.11) means different agents should have the
same consumption levels when the information is perfect.
As for the agent’s labor input lt in producing final goods, there exists following
relation.
∂U(cit, Lit)
∂Lit
=
∂U(cit, Lit)
∂cit
∂F (Kit, y
l
it)
∂ylit
Hit, (2.12)
where i = H, h and t = 1, 2, 3. This equation reflects the marginal substitution
between the labor input and consumption in the first best condition.
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In period one, the labor NH1 and capital xH1 inputs in producing human capital
for high ability should satisfy,
ULH1 = βUcH2FyH2lH2
∂HH2
∂NH1
+β2UcH3FyH3lH3lH3
∂HH3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂NH1
+β2Uch3Fyh3lh3
∂Hh3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂NH1
,
(2.13)
UcH1 = βUcH2FyH2lH2
∂HH2
∂xH1
+β2UcH3FyH3lH3
∂HH3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂xH1
+β2Uch3Fyh3lh3
∂Hh3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂xH1
.
(2.14)
They are the Euler equations of NH1 and xH1. The last parts of (2.13) (2.14) show
the external effect when high ability agent uses his resources in producing human
capital.
Theorem 1 When consider the knowledge spillovers, the agent with high ability
should invest more resources in producing human capital.
If we do not consider the external effect, the last parts of (2.13) (2.14) would not
exist in the optimal condition. While
β2Uch3Fyh3lh3
∂Hh3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂NH1
> 0
and
β2Uch3Fyh3lh3
∂Hh3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂xH1
> 0,
then, ULH1 and UcH1 would be higher when consider the knowledge spillovers. As
ULL < 0 and Ucc < 0, the agent has to spend less time in leisure and consume less
goods. In other words, the agent should use more labor and capital in producing
human capital.
In period one, the labor Nh1 and capital xh1 inputs in producing human capital
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for low ability should satisfy, which are:
ULh1 = βUch2Fyh2lh2
∂Hh2
∂Nh1
+ β2Uch3Fyh3lh3
∂Hh3
∂Hh2
∂Hh2
∂Nh1
, (2.15)
Uch1 = βUch2Fyh2lh2
∂Hh2
∂xh1
+ β2Uch3Fyh3lh3
∂Hh3
∂Hh2
∂Hh2
∂xh1
. (2.16)
They are Nh1 and xh1’s Euler equations which are the same as the conditions without
considering the external effect.
In period two, the labor Ni2 and capital xi2 inputs in producing human capital
should satisfy,
ULi2 = βUci3Fyi3li3
∂Hi3
∂Ni2
, (2.17)
Uci2 = βUci3Fyi3li3
∂Hi3
∂xi2
. (2.18)
Here i = H, h. As individuals just live for three period, in the last period, the
agents will not invest any resources in producing human capital, then the inputs
in producing human capital in period two would just have effects on producing the
final goods. Therefore, these Euler equations are the same as the conditions without
considering the external effects.
In period one, the physical capital Ii1 input in producing final goods, we get
Uci1 = βUci2Fki2 + β
2Uci3Fki3(1− δk), (2.19)
Uci2 = βUci3Fki3 . (2.20)
Here i = H, h.
From equation (2.11),we could find out that in every period, each type has the
same consumption. However, from equation (2.12), the agent with high ability has
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to invest more resources in human capital accumulation. Under the condition with
private information, the agent with high ability would like to hide his ability and
pretend to be low ability; therefore, the allocation will not be Pareto optimal.
2.3 Second Best Allocation
In this part, I consider the economy with private information, and the social
planner could just observe the set (c, yH , yl, x, I) = (cit, y
H
it , y
l
it, xit, Iit), here i = H, h
and t = 1, 2, 3. Besides the feasible conditions in every period just as the equation
(2.8), (2.9), (2.10), the social planner uses the incentive-compatibility conditions to
distinguish agents with different types, and the government recognizes a given agent’s
ability at the beginning of period.
In third period, the incentive-compatibility condition for high ability agent:
U(cH3, LH3) = u(cH3) + v(1− y
l
H3
HH3
) ≥ u(ch3) + v(1− y
l
H3
HH3
). (2.21)
Here HH3 = G(θH , xH2, y
H
H2) + (1− δH)HH2.
In second period, the incentive-compatibility condition for high ability agent:
U(cH2, 1− y
H
H3
HH2
− y
l
H3
HH2
)+β(U(cH3, 1− y
l
H3
HH3
)) ≥ U(ch2, 1− y
H
h3
HH2
− y
l
h3
HH2
)+βU(ch3, 1− y
l
h3
HH3
)
(2.22)
Here HH2 = G(θH , xH2, y
H
H2)+(1−δH)HH1 and HH3 = G(θH , xh2, yHh2)+(1−δH)HH2.
In period one, the incentive-compatibility condition for high ability agent,
2∑
t=1
βt−1U(cHt, 1− y
H
Ht
HHt
− y
l
Ht
HHt
) + β2U(cH3, 1− y
l
H3
HH3
)
≥ U(ch1, 1− y
H
h1
HH1
− y
l
h1
HH1
) + βU(ch2, 1− y
H
h2
H ′H2
− y
l
h2
H ′H2
) + β2U(ch3, 1− y
l
h3
H”H3
).
(2.23)
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Here H ′H2 = G(θH , xhl, y
H
hl)+(1−δH)HH1 and H”H3 = G(θH , xh2, yHh2)+(1−δH)H ′H2.
In period 1, the social planner considers the optimal problem under the con-
straints of feasible conditions, equation (2.8), (2.9), (2.10) and incentive-compatibility
, equation (2.21), (2.22), (2.23). In this case, at the optimal condition, the agent is
indifferent between truthful telling and applying the strategy relevant to the above
binding incentive-compatibility constraints. However, once the social planner recog-
nizes the agent’s real type and the series of allocation would be decided, then, among
the three incentive-compatibility constraints, only the (2.23) incentive-compatibility
constraint will be valid.
The first order conditions with respect to (c, yH , yl, x, I) = (cit, y
H
it , y
l
it, xit, Iit) are
as follow, and see the detail calculation process in Appendix A.
The consumption of high ability agent cHt,
βt−1(1 + µ)
∂U(cHt, LHt)
∂cHt
= λt. (2.24)
The consumption of low ability agent cht,
βt−1(1 + µ)
∂U(cht, Lht)
∂cht
= λt. (2.25)
Here λt for t = 1, 2, 3 denotes the Lagrange multipliers of the feasible conditions (2.8)
(2.9) (2.10), and µ denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the incentive-compatibility
constraint (2.23), which means the shadow price of the variables.
Theorem 2 When the agents’ ability is heterogeneous and private information, the
optimal allocation for consumption should be cHt > cht, which means we need to pay
the information rent to high ability agent.
From equation (2.24) and (2.25), we have (1 + µ)UcHt = (1 − µ)Ucht , while the
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IC condition (2.23) is binding, the Lagrange multiplier µ > 0, then UcHt < Ucht , as
Ucc < 0, then we have cHt > cht.
The high ability agent’s effective labor ylHt which is used for producing final goods,
∂U(cHt, LHt)
∂LHt
1
HHt
=
∂U(cHt, LHt)
∂cHt
∂F (KHt, y
l
Ht)
∂ylHt
, (2.26)
here t = 1, 2, 3, which is the same as the conditions in the first best allocation.
The low ability agent’s effective labor ylht which is used for producing final goods,
∂U(cht, Lht)
∂Lht
1
Hht
<
∂U(cht, Lht)
∂cht
∂F (Kht, y
l
ht)
∂ylht
. (2.27)
Here t = 2, 3, except the initial period, the optimal condition of ylht is different from
the first best allocation.
The high ability agent’s effective labor yHHt which is used for producing human
capital, in period one:
−ULH1
HH1
+ βULH2
yHH2 + y
l
H2
(HH2)2
∂HH2
∂yHH1
+ β2ULH3
ylH3
(HH3)2
∂HH3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂yHH1
+ β2ULh3
ylh3
(Hh3)2
∂Hh3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂yHH1
=
µ
1 + µ
β2ULh3ULh3
ylh3
(Hh3)2
∂Hh3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂yHH1
.
(2.28)
In period two:
ULH2
HH2
= βULH3
ylH3
(HH3)2
∂HH3
∂yHH2
. (2.29)
Obviously , the equation (2.28) is different from the first best allocation while
(2.29) is the same.
The low ability agent’s effective labor yHht which is used for producing human
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capital, in period one:
−ULh1
Hh1
+ βULh2
yHh2 + y
l
h2
(Hh2)2
∂Hh2
∂yHh1
+ β2ULh3
ylh3
(Hh3)2
∂Hh3
∂Hh2
∂Hh2
∂yHh1
= µ(−U
∗
LH1
HH1
+ βU∗LH2
yHh2 + y
l
h2
(H ′H2)2
∂H ′H2
∂yHh1
+ β2U∗LH3
ylh3
(H∗h3)2
∂H∗H3
∂H ′H2
∂H ′h2
∂yHh1
)
(2.30)
In period two:
−ULh2
Hh2
+ βULh3
ylh3
(Hh3)2
∂Hh3
∂yHh2
= µ(−U
∗
LH2
H ′H2
+ βU∗LH3
ylh3
(H”H3)2
∂H”H3
∂yHh2
) (2.31)
Here U∗ denotes the utility when high ability agent pretends to be low ability agent.
The high ability agent’s physical capital xHt which is used for human capital
accumulation, in period one:
UcH1 = βULH2
yHH2 + y
l
H2
(HH2)2
∂HH2
∂xH1
+ β2ULH3
ylH3
(HH3)2
∂HH3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂xH1
+
1
1 + µ
(β2ULh3
ylh3
(Hh3)2
∂Hh3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂xH2
)
(2.32)
In period two:
UcH2 = βULH3
ylH3
(HH3)2
∂HH3
∂xH2
(2.33)
Compared with equation (2.18) in the first-best allocation, the right hand side
of equation (2.32) is less than µ
1+µ
(β2ULh3
ylh3
(Hh3)2
∂Hh3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂xH2
), which means the value of
UcH1 is less than that in the first best allocation and the high ability agent would
consume more in period one when the agents’ ability is private information.
The low ability agents’ physical capital xht, which is used for human capital
accumulation, in period one:
Uchl > βULh2
yHh2 + y
l
h2
(Hh2)2
∂Hh2
∂xh1
+ β2ULh3
ylh3
(Hh3)2
∂Hh3
∂Hh2
∂Hh2
∂xh1
. (2.34)
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In period two:
Uch2 > βULh3
ylh3
(Hh3)2
∂Hh3
∂xh2
. (2.35)
The first order condition of Iit is consistent with the first best allocation, here
i = H, h and t = 1, 2.
2.4 Optimal Taxation
When agents are heterogeneous, the linear taxation is not the Pareto optimal
taxation Golosov and Tsyvinski [46]. Here, I discuss the non-linear taxation which
depends on the observed information {c, yH , yl, x, I} = {cit, yHit , ylit, xit, Iit}.
In the discrete economy, the agent i faces the following problem:
max
{cit,yHit ,ylit,xit,Iit}
2∑
t=1
βt−1U(cit, 1− y
H
it
Hit
− y
l
it
Hit
) + β2U(ci3, 1− y
l
i3
Hi3
) (2.36)
The feasible conditions in every period are the constraints, in the perfect com-
petitive market, as the firms are owned by agents; we have the feasible condition in
period one:
ci1 + xi1 + Ii1 + T (y
H
i1 , y
l
i1, xi1, Ii1) = F (Ki1, y
l
i1). (2.37)
In period two:
ci2 + xi2 + Ii2 + T (y
H
i2 , y
l
i2, xi2, Ii2) = F (Ki2, y
l
i2). (2.38)
In period three:
ci2 + T (y
l
i3) = F (Ki3, y
l
i3). (2.39)
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The first order conditions for the effective labor ylit used for producing final goods:
ULit
Hit
= Ucit ∗ (Fylit −
∂T (yHit , y
l
it, xit, Iit)
∂ylit
). (2.40)
The effective labor yHit used for producing human capital in period one:
−ULi1
Hi1
+ βULi2
yHi2 + y
l
H2
(Hi2)2
∂Hi2
∂yHi1
+β2ULi3
yli3
(Hi3)2
∂Hi3
∂Hi2
∂Hi2
∂yHi1
= Ucit ∗
∂T (yHi1 , y
l
i1, xi1, Ii1)
∂yHi1
.
(2.41)
In period two:
−ULi2
Hi2
+ βULi3
yli3
(Hi3)2
∂Hi3
∂yHi2
= Uci2 ∗
∂T (yHi2 , y
l
i2, xi2, Ii2)
∂yHi2
. (2.42)
The physical capital xit used for human capital accumulation in period one:
Uci1(1+
∂T (yHi1 , y
l
i1, xi1, Ii1)
∂xi1
)
= βULi2
yHi2 + y
l
H2
(Hi2)2
∂Hi2
∂xi1
+ β2ULi3
yli3
(Hi3)2
∂Hi3
∂Hi2
∂Hi2
∂xi1
.
(2.43)
In period two:
Uci2(1 +
∂T (yHi2 , y
l
i2, xi2, Ii2)
∂xi2
) = βULi3
yli3
(Hi3)2
∂Hi3
∂Hi2
. (2.44)
The physical capital Ii1 used for producing final goods, in period one:
Uci1(1 +
∂T (yHi1 , y
l
i1, xi1, Ii1)
∂Ii1
) = βUci2Fki2 + β
2Uci3Fki3(1− δk). (2.45)
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In period two:
Uci2(1 +
∂T (yHi1 , y
l
i1, xi1, Ii1)
∂Ii2
= βUci3Fki3 . (2.46)
Here i = H, h;t = 1, 2, 3
Compared the above conditions with the conditions in second best allocation, we
have the following conclusions:
Theorem 3 When the information is incomplete, other than the initial period, the
marginal labor income tax on high ability agent should be zero, while on low ability
agent should be positive.
According to the equation of (2.26), we could find out in equation (2.40),
∂T (yHHt, y
l
Ht, xHt, IHt)
∂ylHt
= 0,
while for low ability agent, we have the inequality of (2.27), it is easy to have
∂T (yHht,y
l
ht,xht,Iht)
∂ylht
> 0. Then, we have the above conclusion.
Since positive marginal tax rates have negative effects on the agents’ efforts, and
compared with the low ability agent, the individual with high ability has higher
elasticity of labor supply, then if the revenue collected by tax is the same, the zero
marginal tax on earning beyond some level could be optimal.
As Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan [69] state the optimal marginal taxation de-
pends on the distribution of ability, while in practice, the top marginal income tax
rate in US has declined from 70% in 1979 to 35% in 2010, which is partially consistent
with the above results.
Theorem 4 When the information is incomplete and the high ability agents’ inputs
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of producing human capital have external effects, it is optimal for government to
subsidy them.
At period one, the effective labor yHH1 have the equation of (2.41), with considering
the equation (2.27), we have,
∂T (yHHt, y
l
Ht, xHt, IHt)
∂yHHt
= − β
2ULh3
(1 + µ)UcH1
ylh3
(Hh3)2
∂Hh3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂yHH1
. (2.47)
Obviously, we have
∂T (yHHt,y
l
Ht,xHt,IHt)
∂yHHt
< 0; as for the physical capital xH1, we have
equation (2.43), compared with equation (2.32), we get,
∂T (yHH1, y
l
H1, xH1, IH1)
∂xH1
= −( β
2ULh3
(1 + µ)UcH1
ylh3
(Hh3)2
∂Hh3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂yHH1
). (2.48)
thus,
∂T (yHH1,y
l
H1,xH1,IH1)
∂xH1
< 0.
Rauch [77] concludes that if the average education increases one more year in a
metropolitan area, wages would increase 3%. In modern economics, the emergence
of high-trained labor force is normally treated as resource of economic growth and
their emigration is constantly disputed as the barrier to the rapid growth of lots of
developing countries. Since the high ability agent’s investment in human capital has
the social scale effects, the subsidy will obviously improve the social welfare.
Theorem 5 When the information is incomplete, the government should subsidy the
low ability agent’s physical capital which is used for human capital accumulation.
In the second best economy, the conditions for physical capital input are inequa-
tion (2.34) (2.35), compared with (2.43) (2.44), we have
∂T (yHht,y
l
ht,xht,Iht)
∂xht
< 0, t = 1, 2.
Even though the low-skilled agents’ increasing of human capital accumulation
does not have the external effect, considering the catching-up effect, it is still worth
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for government to subsidy the low-skilled agents, which could narrow the gap between
the rich and poor so that the social welfare could be improved.
Theorem 6 When the information is incomplete, the marginal tax rate of physical
capital which is used for producing final goods is zero.
With the equation (2.45) and (2.46) and (2.19) (2.20) in the second best economy,
we have
∂T (yHht,y
l
ht,xht,Iht)
∂Iit
= 0, i = H, h.
Just as Chamley [18] and Judd [60] show that at least in people’s expectation,
the optimal capital income should be zero, the intuition behind the zero capital
taxes is that the taxation on capital could lead large distortions to intertemporal
consumption, and consequently decrease the amount saving, which would lower the
aggregate output in the future.
2.4.1 Conclusion
In this section, we explored the optimal taxation issue in the neoclassical economy
with considering the positive externality between different kinds of agents. The agent
heterogeneity will be result in different taxation distortion across individuals. Based
on the assumption that both physical capital and time are necessary, not only to
produce the final goods, but also to improve the skill levels, it gave the theoretical
support for some public policies, such as subsidizing the education.
Several assumptions are made in this section, and now I would conjecture on
their role in the main conclusions. Firstly, in the dynamic environment, I just ignore
any aggregate or idiosyncratic uncertainty, which allow us to simplify the optimal
dynamic taxation issues to a static subproblem. Conversely, the sign of marginal
income taxation would be influenced by the uncertainty of the economics,especially
the marginal capital income taxation.
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Secondly, the model just considers the issue about how to minimize the distortion
when the government need to collect the given amount of revenue, but we ignore the
important function caused by the government expenditure, such as the supplying the
public goods and the redistribution effects. Barro [10] supplies the endogenous model
with considering the contribution of government spending in utility and production,
which we could use for analyzing the optimal taxations.
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3. OPTIMAL FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY WITH HETEROGENEOUS
AGENTS AND NONLINEAR INCOME TAXATION
Previous papers consider optimal fiscal policy in an economy without involving
money, or discuss optimal monetary policy with homogeneous agents in reduced-form
approaches such as money in the utility model and cash-in-advance model. Different
from them, in this section, I study the optimal monetary and fiscal policy with
heterogeneous agents other than homogeneous agents. In the economy, as there exists
friction to value money, making money essential can expand the set of feasible trades.
Based on the search-theoretical environment, I first solve the households’ problem
in the centralized and decentralized market, and find out the optimal conditions.
Then, we describes the problem that social planner faces by involving uncertainty
and agents whose types are continuous. By comparing the optimal conditions in this
generous setting, I show that the Friedman rule is no longer optimal when jointed
with nonlinear taxation of income. Moreover, the capital income taxation is not zero.
3.1 Introduction
Friedman [36] states that in order to attain the first-best allocation, the nominal
interest rate need to be set to zero since positive nominal interest rates indicate a
distorting tax on real money balances, which is known as the Friedman rule. Without
double, it is a critical conclusion in monetary economics. Chari,Christiano and Kehoe
[19] show that in three different kinds of homogeneous agent models of money demand
such as the putting money in utility function model (Sidrauski [74] and [73]), the
cash-credit model (Lucas and Stokey [68]), and the shopping-time model (Kimbrough
[56]), when preferences are homotheticity and weakly separability, the Friedman rule
is valid. However, if we consider the heterogeneity, other than representative agents
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in the economy, whether the Friedman rule still holds? If not, what is the optimal
monetary policy ?
Since a disproportionate amount of money holding, monetary policy would have
different effects across agents . For example, for those families with lower income,
the amount of cash in hand has always occupied a higher proportion of their total
wealth. Erosa and Gervais [32], based on US data, show that compared with high
income households, low income families use cash for a higher fraction of their total
consumptions. By using the cash-in-advance model, Wen[85] shows that if the annual
inflation rate is 10%, households would like to recrease up to 15% of average con-
sumption an annual year in order to obtain the Friedman rule inflation rate, which is
significantly bigger than that of with considering homogeneous agents (Lucas [66]).
Therefore, the heterogeneity could lead to dramatically different results of monetary
policies from those under the representative-agent assumption.
In recent years, some studies have explored the optimal monetary policy by in-
volving the heterogeneity in the economy, and achieved different results. Costa and
Werning [26] consider an economy where individuals have different labor productivi-
ties and government stipulates the nominal interest rate and nonlinear labor income
taxes. They use the money-in-utility model and assume individual labor ability
are their own information, based on Mirrlees [71]. The paper gains the conclusion
that the Friedman rule still holds if money and leisure in utility are complements.
However, as Albanesi [4] points out the empirical works is inconsistent with their
assumptions which would cause a cross-sectional distribution of money holdings.
Moreover, their model considers the money in a reduced-form model and has not
supplied the micro-foundation of money in the economy.
Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin [13] discuss several alternative monetary economies
in which agents have heterogeneous money holding, and conclude that Friedman rule
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does not maximize ex post steady-state welfare with considering the redistribution
effects. However, their results are not robust as they ignore the asset market in
their economy. If the asset market is incomplete, as noted by Aiyagari [2], agents
would have more incentives to prepare for self-insure against individual shocks by
precautionary savings, which motivate agents to hold extra cash in hand to prevent
severe budget constraints in the future. Therefore, in this condition, money serves
not solely as a medium of exchange, but also as a store of value.
This section reconsiders the optimal fiscal and monetary policy problem with
search-theoretic framework. Different from the classical search-theoretical papers
such as Lagos and Wright [64] and Williamson and Wright [87], an important as-
sumption of this article is that individuals also need to accumulate physical capital
to produce in the economy. Just as Kocherlakota [62] states, we need to answer
the following questions: what are the micro-foundations for the difference in returns
between other assets and money ? How are these micro-foundations to affect the
feature of optimal monetary policy and fiscal policy?
Since in this section, each period is assigned into two subperiods, and there exists
two kinds of markets, opening separately in the economy which are centralized market
and decentralized market. While in the centralized market, economy is operating
as in the classical growth models. Households supply their labors and capitals,
receive their payment and adjust their asset levels in the frictionless market. In
the decentralized market, some parts of households could trade with some one by
anonymous matching, which supplies the microfoundations of monetary theory.
While the households in the economy are heterogeneity in skills which are private
information and always changing over time, the section develops a full characteri-
zation of the socially optimal allocation in this set-up. In order to classify different
kinds of agents, we need to consider a large number of incentive constraints, which
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would lead us to reconsider the optimal policy under these settings. The section
finds out that Friedman rule is not optimal when jointed with nonlinear taxation. In
addition, the capital income taxation is not zero and marginal labor income taxation
is negative correlated with skills.
By investigating different kinds of assets and heterogeneity in the standard search-
theoretical model, the main goal of this section is to find out the solutions of the above
questions. Section 2 introduces the model and the basic problems for households.
Section 3 derives the optimal conditions for social planner’s problem and find out
the optimal monetary policy. Section 4 presents the conclusions.
3.2 The Model
The model extends the framework in Lagos and Wright [64], and is close to
the baseline model in Aruoba and Chugh [5], Aruoba, Waller and Wright [6] and
Williamson and Wright [87], by allowing capital accumulation. The main difference
is that in this economy, there exists a continuum of infinitely lived individuals with
differences in productivity other than homogeneous agents. The purpose of this
assumption is to introduce the heterogeneity in a tractable way with considering the
micro-foundation of monetary economics.
The model considers an economy with infinite periods where time is discrete
t = 0, 1, .... There exists a continuum unit measure of agents, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]
with identical preferences, whose skills differ across households and over time. Let
Θ = [θ, θ] be the set of ex-ante types and the distribution is stable over time by
applying the law of large number. At the starting of period t, agent i privately
notifies his history θti = (θi0, ..., θit) ∈ Θt of past and current skill types but not his
future skills which are governed by Markov process. At each period t, the probability
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measure of type θt is denoted by µ(θt) ≥ 0, with ∫
θt∈Θt
dµ(θt) = 1 1. This implies that
the individual’s choices in period t just depends on his history. Moreover, the skill
processes are independent across households and there is no aggregate uncertainty in
the environment, as argued in Aruoba and Chugh [5], this is without loss of generality
since we always gain the conclusions in the deterministic steady states.
As in the typical search model, each period is separated into two subperiods, say
day and night. A frictionless centralized market(CM) opens during the day, and a
decentralized market (DM) opens at night. During the CM, households rent their
previously accumulated capital and supply labor in the competitive market, and they
also choose their consumption level in the goods market. Meanwhile, they also adjust
their holdings of money, capital and government bond2.
When entering the DM, each family receives an individual shock which governs
his trading status and is independent with households’ skills. A given household is a
seller in the DM with a fixed probability σ, a buyer with fixed probability σ, neither
a seller nor a buyer with probability 1− 2σ which means that with probability with
1 − 2σ, a family can not trade at all in the DM, here σ ∈ [0, 1/2] 3. As there is
no credit or record keeping, households interact with anonymous bilateral matching.
The buyer uses the money to purchases goods from the seller who produces goods
by using his own labor and capital while the terms of trade is determined trough
bargaining just like the standard search models4.
1The heterogeneity in productivity may have the same effect, in some sense, as the preference
shocks in the model, as in Wen [85].
2Different from Walsh[84]), the asset market opens first before individuals face the cash-in-
advance constraint, which is consistent with Lucas and Stockey [68].
3This structure is similar to Trejos and Wright (1995).
4They also could trade by directed search and price posting, such as Mortensen and Wright
[72], other than random matching and bargaining, but it will increase the complexity of the model
considerably with the heterogeneous agents. If not having additional constraints about production
function, the agents with highest ability may monopoly the DM, which will violate the original
intention of considering the behaviors in DM.
31
In what follows, I provide the information about production, household behavior
and government in more details, and define the monetary equilibrium.
3.2.1 Production
Both in the CM and DM, the inputs of production are capital and effective labor.
A household with skill θi uses his real labor input li ot generate effective labor hi
according to the function hi = θili. Here, both actual labor li and skill θi are
unobservable while only effective labor hi can be observed.
In the CM, just like in the standard neoclassical growth theory, there is a final
good that can be used not only for consumption but also for investment, produced
by the constant-returns technology Yt = F (Kt, Ht), here, the function F (.) is strictly
increasing and strictly concave, Kt =
∫
k(θt)dµ(θt) denotes the aggregate capital,
Ht =
∫
h(θt)dµ(θt) denotes aggregate effective labor. In competitive markets, firms
hire labor and capital from household, and profit maximization implies the real wage
wt = FH(Kt, Ht) and real rental rate rt = FK(Kt, Ht)).
In the DM, although firms do not operate, the sellers’ own effective labor e and
capital k, carried from the CM in this period, can be used to produce with the
technology q = f(e, k), which implies that the cost of production is e = c(q, k) and
disutility is c(q, k)/θ. Since the production function f(.) is strictly increasing and
strictly concave, it is easy to show that cq, cqq, ckk > 0, ck, cqk < 0.
3.2.2 Government
As in Aruoba and Chugh [5], government consumption takes place in the CM
while the expenditure could be financed by taxes, money creation and debt issuance.
As for the form of taxation, the model is based on the dynamic Mirrlees literature
which is different from those of Ramsey approach. At period t, the taxation is a
nonlinear function of agent’s effective labor supply and capital stock in that period,
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which could be denoted as T (ht, kt).
5 The government’s budget constraint in period
t is:
Mt +Bt + Pt
∫
T (ht, kt)dµ(θ
t) = PtGt +Rt−1Bt−1 +Mt−1.
The government also face the standard no-Ponzi constraint, which is
∞∑
t=0
[
Pt
P0
Πt−1s=0
1
Rs−1
(Gt − Mt −Mt−1
Pt
−
∫
T (ht, kt)dµ(θ
t))] ≤ 0.
3.2.3 Households
At period t, CM opens first and I consider the household’s problem in CM and
DM, respectively.
3.2.3.1 Household’s Problem in CM
In the beginning of period t, a household joins the CM with nominal government
bond bt−1, money holdings mt−1 and capital kt, and knows his own skill type at time t
denoted by θt, which means that the history of his skill θ
t = (θ0, ..., θt). Instantaneous
utility for everyone in the period t CM is U(xt)−lt, where xt is consumption level and
lt is labor
6. Assume that U is twice continuously differentiable with U
′
> 0, U
′′
< 0,
lim
x→0
U
′
(x) =∞, and there exist x∗ ∈ (0,∞) so that U ′(x∗) = 1 with U(x∗) > x∗.
Let W (θt;mt−1, bt−1, kt) denote the value function for a household with type θt
at the beginning of CM, and V (θt;mt, bt, kt+1) be the value function in the DM.
The discount rate between the DM and CM is β ∈ (0, 1) while there is no discount
5Since the agents face the skill shock over time and there is no record keeping, which is similar to
the basic environment in Albanesi and Sleet [3], the taxation just depends on agents’ behaviors in
each period, other than Kocherlakota [62] which depends on the all history of agents’ labor supplies.
6With the quasi-linear utility, we could derive may results analytically, while with general pref-
erences, the model requires numerical methods, just like Chiu and Molico [21]. Rocheteau, Shell
and Wright [79] show how to get the same simplification with general preferences.
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between the CM and DM. Then, the household’s problem in CM can be writen as:
W (θt;mt−1, bt−1, kt) = max{xt,lt,mt,bt,kt+1}
U(xt)− lt + V (θt;mt, bt, kt+1)
subject to
bt+mt+Ptxt+Pt(kt+1− (1− δ)kt) = Ptwtht+mt−1 +Ptrtkt+Rt−1bt−1−PtT (ht, kt).
Here, Pt means the consumption goods’ price level in the CM, δ is the discount rate
of capital, rt is the capital’s real rent rate, Rt−1 is the gross nominal return of the
one-period government bond which is purchased in period t− 1. While the effective
labor ht = θtlt, replace it in the above equitation and we can find out the optimal
conditions of this problem as follows:
U
′
(xt) =
1
θt(wt − Th(ht, kt)) , (3.1)
Wm(θ
t;mt−1, bt−1, kt) = Vm(θt;mt, bt, kt+1) =
1
Ptθt(wt − Th(ht, kt)) , (3.2)
Wb(θ
t;mt−1, bt−1, kt) = Rt−1Vb(θt;mt, bt, kt+1) =
Rt−1
Ptθt(wt − Th(ht, kt)) , (3.3)
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Wk(θ
t;mt−1, bt−1, kt) = (1+rt−δ−Tk(ht, kt))Vk(θt;mt, bt, kt+1) = 1 + rt − δ − Tk(ht, kt)
θt(wt − Th(ht, kt)) .
(3.4)
Define λθt =
1
Ptθt(wt−Th(ht,kt)) as the agent with skill θt’ marginal value of entering
period t with an additional unit of money. Based on equation (3.1), we know that the
consumption good demand xt in the CM is an increasing function of agent’s skill θt.
The first-order conditions (3.2)-(3.4) tell us that the value functions W (.) and V (.)
are linear, and a specific household’s marginal utility of wealth is not related with
his trading status in the previous DM, but depends on the skill type. Different from
Lagos and Wright (2005), the holdings of money, bond and capital are not identical
any more.
3.2.3.2 Household’s Problem in DM
After the CM closes, agents draw the shocks deciding whether they are buyer or
seller. When the DM opens, households know their types and could match bilaterally.
While the capital cannot be used for DM payment, as Williamson and Wright [87]
state, the reason is that physical capital is installed in place and it is not convenient
for consumers to travel around by taking it with them 7. Therefore, even though in
the DM, households can use their accumulated capital level as an input to produce
the general goods, households can not use the holdings of capital as payment when
7By introducing the financial intermediation in the economy, we could consider the capital and
credit as the payment method just as Woodford [89].
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they are buyers. The household’s problem in DM can be written as follows:
V (θt;mt, bt, kt+1) = +σ[−c(qst , kt+1)/θt + βEt(W (θt+1;mt + dst , bt, kt+1))]
σ[u(qbt ) + βEt(W (θ
t+1;mt − dbt , bt, kt+1))]
+(1− 2σ)βEt(W (θt+1;mt, bt, kt+1)).
(3.5)
Here, Et(.) = E(.|θt) means the conditional expectation relied on the information
until time t, and (qbt , d
b
t) and (q
s
t , d
s
t) mean the amount of goods and dollars exchanged
when the agent is buyer and seller respectively. The first item on the right hand side
of equation (3.5) represents the expected payoff if the household is a seller, the
second item represents the expected payoff if the household is a seller, and the last
one represents the expected payoff if the household neither a seller nor a buyer in
the DM.
Since the value function W (.) is linearity, we could rewrite the equation (3.5) as
follow:
V (θt;mt, bt, kt+1) = σ[u(q
b
t )− c(qst , kt+1)/θt − βEt(λθt+1(dbt − dst))]
+βEt(W (θ
t+1;mt, bt, kt+1)).
(3.6)
Therefore, in order to find out the solution of the household’s problem, all we have
to do is to find out how qt, dt is determined under this pricing schemes.
3.2.4 Bargaining
Under the search-theoretical framework, in the DM, the quantity of items used
for trades are most generally decided by bargaining. Let φ ∈ [0, 1] represent the
bargaining power of buyers, while φ = 0 means the seller make a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the buyer, and φ = 1 means the power reverses. Suppose individual i with
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skill type θti is a buyer in DM, who will meet the seller with skill type θ
t
j. The
generalized Nash bargaining problem can be written as follows:
max
{qit,dit}
[u(qit) + βEt(W (θ
t+1
i ;mit − dit, bit, ki,t+1)
− βEt(W (θt+1i ;mit, bit, ki,t+1)]φ[−
c(qit, kj,t+1)
θjt
+ βEt(W (θ
t+1
j ;mjt + dit, bjt, kj,t+1)
− βEt(W (θt+1j ;mjt, bjt, kj,t+1)]1−φ
(3.7)
subject to
dit ≤ mit. (3.8)
Here, qit denotes the quantity of goods that the seller i gives to the buyer in
exchange of the amount of money dit. The constraint (3.8) is the feasibility condition
for the buyer, which is just like the cash-in-advance constraint in Stokey and Lucas
[68]. A question naturally arises: Whether the constraint (3.8) always binds as in the
representative-agent models? As Walsh [84] states, even though in the next period,
the CM opens first, the constraint may rarely bind because the household can almost
fully self-insure itself against random liquidity-demand shocks by working harder and
accumulating more cash in hand in the CM, especially the households with high skill
type in period t. On the other hand, as households ability is uncertainty in next
period, the household has incentive to reduce the consumption in DM and take the
money to the next period to smooth the future consumption.
As W (.) is a linear function, we can rewrite the bargaining problem as follows:
max
{qit,dit}
[u(qit)− βEt(λθi,t+1dit)]φ[−c(qit, kj,t+1)/θjt + βEt(λθj,t+1dit)]1−φ
subject to (3.8).
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Let χit denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint (3.8). The first-oder
conditions are:
φu
′
(qit)[−c(qit, kj,t+1)
θjt
+ βEt(λθj,t+1dit)]
− (1− φ)cq(qit, kj,t+1)
θjt
[u(qit)− βEt(λθi,t+1dit)] = 0,
(3.9)
φβEtλθi,t+1 [−
c(qit, kj,t+1)
θjt
+ βEt(λθj,t+1dit)]
− (1− φ)βEtλθj,t+1 [u(qit)− βEt(λθi,t+1dit)] =
− χit[u(qit)− βEt(λθi,t+1dit)]1−φ[−c(qit, kj,t+1)/θjt + βEt(λθj,t+1dit)]φ,
(3.10)
χit(mit − dit) = 0, χit ≥ 0, (3.11)
From the equation (4.1), the relation between dit and qit is:
dit =
φu
′
(qit)c(qit, kj,t+1) + (1− φ)cq(qit, kj,t+1)u(qit)
φθjtu
′(qit)βEtλθj,t+1 + (1− φ)cq(qit, kj,t+1)βEtλθi,t+1
. (3.12)
Define the left hand side of (3.12)=z(θit, θjt, qit, kj,t+1), and here, zq > 0 and
zk < 0. Different from the previous work with identical individuals, the bargaining
game not only depends on buyer and seller’s asset holding, but also related with
their skill types. By using the Jensen’s Inequality, the amount dit is lower than the
amount under the situation without uncertainty. As the uncertainty in the future,
the buyer would like to provide less money to exchange the goods in the DM.
Let’s go back to the previous households’ problem in the DM, and find out the
first-order conditions as follows:
Vm(θt;mt, bt, kt+1) = σ[uq
∂qbt
∂mt
− βEt(λθt+1)
∂dbt
∂mt
] + βEt(λθt+1), (3.13)
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Vk(θ
t;mt, bt, kt+1) = σ[
cq
θt
zk
zq
− ck
θt
+βEt(λθt+1)zk]+βEt(Wk(θ
t+1;mt, bt, kt+1)). (3.14)
Define γ(θt, qt, kt+1) =
cq
θt
zk
zq
− ck
θt
+ βEt(λθt+1)zk, we have intertemporal optimal
condition:
Ux(t) = βEt[Ux(t+ 1)((1 + FK(t+ 1)− δ − Tk(t+ 1)]
+σγ(θt, qt, kt+1).
(3.15)
Beside the expression σγ(θt, qt, kt+1), equation (3.15) is the same as a normal in-
tertemporal optimal condition for investment. While in this section, physical capital
is used both in the CM and in the DM, the decisions for capital investment need to
reflect this character. Suppose all else are the same, the item σγ(θt, qt, kt+1) means
the capital’s return in the DM, which captures the argument that the cost of pro-
ducing a certain amount of output in DM is lower if sellers has already accumulated
more physical capital.
3.2.5 Monetary Equilibrium
Given the initial conditions {M0, B0, K0}, policy processes {T (.), Rt} and the gov-
ernment spending process {Gt}, an monetary equilibrium is a collection of {xt, qt, kt,
Kt, lt, Pt,mt,Mt, bt, Bt, rt, wt} such that:
i. Households optimize {xt, lt, kt,mt, qt} to maximize their welfare with consid-
ering the budget constraint, taking the price{Pt, rt, wt} and the policy processes as
given;
ii. Government budget constraints hold every period;
iii. Market clear: ∫
mtdµ(θ
t) = Mt;
∫
btdµ(θ
t) = Bt;∫
ktdµ(θ
t) = Kt;
∫
htdµ(θ
t) = Ht
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iv.Resource constraint:
∫
xtdµ(θ
t) +Kt+1 +Gt = (1− δ)Kt + F (Kt, Ht),
∫
qtdµ(θ
t) = f(
∫
etdµ(θ
t), Kt+1).
3.3 Optimal Policy
Different from the traditional optimal taxation approach since Ramsey [76], the
households are heterogeneous and have the private information about their skills, and
I use the Mirrlees approach to formulate the social planner’s problem that chooses
the specific allocations as a monetary equilibrium (Golosov et al.[44], [46], Costa and
Werning [26]).
Since the individual’s skill history θt is unobservable, the objective of the gov-
ernment act as the social planner is to find the optimal incentive-insurance trade-off
8, which means the allocation must respect incentive-compatibility conditions. A
reporting stategy ξ is a mapping from Θt into Θt. Let
W˜ (ξ;x, h, q, e) = Et
∞∑
i=0
βi{U(xt+i(ξ))− ht+i(ξ)
θt+i
+ σ(u(qt+i(ξ))− et+i(ξ)
θt+i
)},
which is the payoff from reporting strategy ξ for agent with skill type θt.
8The government have the full commitment power such that we could abandon the issues brought
by the time inconsistent.
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Definition 1 An allocation (x, h,K, q, e) is incentive-compatible if
W˜ (ξ∗;x, h, q, e) ≥ W˜ (ξ;x, h, q, e) (3.16)
for any ξ ∈ Θt, while ξ∗(θt) = θt for all θt is the truth-telling strategy.
Besides the incentive-compatible constraint, the series of allocations (x, h,K, q, e)
also need to face the resource constraints which are the feasible conditions.
Definition 2 Define an allocation (x, h,K, q, e) to be feasible if
∫
xtdµ(θ
t) +Kt+1 +Gt ≤ (1− δ)Kt + F (Kt,
∫
htdµ(θ
t)), (3.17)
∫
qtdµ(θ
t) ≤ f(
∫
etdµ(θ
t), Kt+1), (3.18)
for all period t
Here, I only consider direct mechanisms. Based on the revelation principle, the
households’ output and consumption just rely on their own announcements. The
government or social planner’s problem SP (Kt) is:
TV (Kt) = max
x,h,K,q,e
∞∑
i=0
βi
∫
U(xt+i)− ht+i
θt+i
+ σ(u(qt+i)− et+i
θt+i
)dµ(θt)
subject to two feasible conditions (C.2) (C.3) and incentive-compatible condition
(3.16).
In the economy, the planner maximizes the social welfare by given the initially K∗t
units of capital. Different from Acemoglu et al.(2010), the ex ante objective weights
agents are the same as the distribution of the skill levels.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that any (x∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) that solves the social planner’s
problem SP (.), then the function TV (.) is strictly increasing, which means TV (Kt) <
TV (K∗t ) for all Kt < K
∗
t .
Proof. In Appendix B.
The basic idea of this proposition can be explained as below. Suppose that TV (.) is
not strictly increasing, which means that the benevolent planner has not allocated
all the given capital level. Therefore, the social planner could increase /U
′
(x∗it(θ
t
i))
for all θti , which guarantees that all households’ utility level increase by . Since
all types’ utility are going up with the same value, this improvement will not affect
incentive-compatibility. Meanwhile,  is small enough to ensure the feasible condition
will not be violated. Thus, we could have the conclusion that the aggregate value
function is strictly increasing.
Proposition 2 There exists (x∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) solve the social planner’s problem,
which satisfies:
1− δ + FK(K∗t+1,
∫
h∗t+1dµ(θ
t+1))
U ′(x∗t )− σu′(q∗t )fK(
∫
e∗tdµ(θt), K∗t+1)
= Et
1
βU ′(x∗t+1)
.
(3.19)
Proof. In Appendix B.
Here is the basic idea of the proof. As the distribution of individuals’ ability is
continuous, the difficulty of solving the social problem’s problem SP (Kt) is to artic-
ulate the incentive-compatible conditions for all individuals. In order to overcome
the difficulty, we transfer the maximization problem into the minimization problem
which uses the least resource but delivers the same utility. Since the social plan-
ner maximizes the social welfare with considering the feasible constraints, according,
the optimum allocation (x∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) is also the solution of the minimization
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problem. I define the new allocation (x˜, h∗, K˜, q˜, e∗) as follows:
x˜ = x∗, K˜ = K∗, q˜ = q∗
for all the other periods, except that
x˜t = x
∗
t + ψt,
x˜t+1 = x
∗
t+1 + ψt+1,
K˜t+1 = K
∗
t+1 + ςt,
q˜t = q
∗
t + ϕt,
The main point is that on one hand, this variation will not influence the countless
incentive constraints. On the other hand, it just have affected the resource constraint.
Then, we need to prove the new allocation satisfies the conditions of feasible and
incentive-compatible. By applying the monotonicity of the aggregate value function,
we can get the result that the maximization problem and minimization problem are
equal. Therefore, as the former allocation is optimal, it should be that the changes
in the new allocation are zero which means that (ψt, ςt, ϕt) = 0 is the solution of the
minimization problem.
Actually, in Golosov et al. [46], the above intertemporal optimal condition is a
typical Inverse Euler Equation. However, if there is no uncertainty in the economy,
we could rewrite the condition as:
U
′
(xt) = σu
′
(qt)fK(t) + βU
′
(xt+1)(1 + FK(t+ 1)− δ), (3.20)
which is just the standard Euler Equation.
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Proposition 3 The optimal taxation on capital income is positive, and the optimal
nominal interest rate is greater than 1, which means the Friedman rule is not optimal.
By using the Jensen’s Inequality, we can rewrite the equation (3.19) as follows:
U
′
(x∗t ) ≤ σu
′
(q∗t )fK(
∫
e∗tdµ(θ
t), K∗t+1)+βEtU
′
(x∗t+1)(1−δ+FK(K∗t+1,
∫
h∗t+1dµ(θ
t+1)))
(3.21)
Comparing the result with the intertemporal optimal conditions, such as equation
(15), we know that Tk(kt+1, ht+1) > 0. Intuitively, if an agent, especially those with
higher income in this period, prefers not to tell the truth, he has incentive to save
more in this period. The positive taxation on their capital income will prevent such
kinds of deviation.
The optimal real interest rate rt+1 satisfies
1
U ′(xt)
=
1
β(1 + rt+1)
Et
1
U ′(xt+1)
. (3.22)
Combining with equation (3.19), we can get:
1 + rt+1 =
U
′
(xt)(1 + FK(t+ 1)− δ)
U ′(xt)− σu′(qt)fK(t) > 1 + FK(t+ 1)− δ. (3.23)
Therefore, the gross real interest rate is higher than 1 so is the nominal interest
rate. On one hand, although the interest rate is greater than 1, individuals still have
incentive to holding money as money acts as the instrument to exchange goods in
the night. On the other hand, as showed in the equation (3.12), individuals hold
extra money that they do not use in the DM. In some sense, the extra money plays
the role as insurance to against the uncertainty in the future, which also affects the
incentive to work. The positive real interest rate will decrease the amount of extra
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money.
3.4 Conclusion
Based on search-theoretical environment, this section studies the optimal policy
issues in the economy with heterogeneous agents, supplying the microfoundation of
holding money and introducing money essential other than previous literature which
treat money in the reduce form. In the spirit of Mirrlees’s private information frame-
work, I prove that the capital income taxation is no longer zero and the Friedman
rule is not optimal when combined with nonlinear taxation of income.
Woodford [89] points out the financial intermediaries are playing more and more
important role in the economy, especially during the financial crisis. Since in the
model, money is an exchange instrument. If we consider other payment methods,
such as credit and collateral in the economy, we need to add the financial interme-
diation, which will help us explain the the phenomenons in the asset market during
the financial crisis. I will leave this as the further job.
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4. LIQUIDITY, COLLATERAL CONSTRAINT AND FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIATION
4.1 Introduction
In many standard macroeconomic models, identical households can invest in non-
financial firms directly, without using a financial sector. As stated in Brunnermeier
[16], this approach can only yield realistic macroeconomic predictions if, in reality,
there are no financial frictions. Following the Great Depression, economists such as
Fisher [35] and Keynes [55] pointed out that failure of financial markets would result
in an economic downturn. Financial crises happen every now and then, spilling
over into the real economy, and Kindleberger[57] documents that financial crises
have occurred at roughly ten-year intervals in Western Europe over the past four
centuries. This means they are relatively common in history. The current financial
crisis starting in August 2007 has underscored and reminded us once again of the
importance of financial intermediaries for the business cycle.
During the last decade, asset prices have been cyclical and have led the business
cycle. Figure C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix C describe the time series of two broad
stock price indexes and select macro variables for the US from 1997Q1 to 2012Q2.
All series are percentage deviations of quarterly data from trend, and the percentage
deviations of investment, GDP and bond prices are rescaled as indicated in the
figures.1 Two phenomena are apparent in these figures. First, investment and real
GDP move closely with stock prices. Second, stock prices lead the business cycle.
1There are two kinds of stock price indexes. One is the Wilshire 5000 total market full cap index
which is an index of the market value of all stocks actively traded in the US weighted by market
capitalization. The other index is the S&P 500 index which contains the top 500 companies in
main industries of the U.S. economy. The data for investment is real private nonresidential fixed
investment. All the data is available at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis.
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For example, in the 2001-2002 recession, stock prices reached the summit in 2000Q1
and dropped to the trough in 2002Q3, while the investment peaked in 2000Q4 and
reached the trough in 2003Q1. Similarly, in the 2008-2009 recession, stock prices
peaked in 2007Q3 before falling to the trough in 2009Q1. Investment and output
did not reach the peak until 2008Q2 and did not reach the trough until 2009Q2.
One intuitive explanation for these patterns is that shocks to the asset market are
an important cause of the business cycle instead of merely a response to it. A popular
hypothesis along this line is as follows. Sudden drops in equity market liquidity leads
equity prices to fall and the price of liquid assets, such as bonds, to rise. When non-
financial firms face financing constraints on investment, this reduction in equity price
reduces these firms’ ability to finance investment, which will leads to loss of liquidity
in the equity markets and a fall in investment and output, thus this is a recession.
Kiyotaki and Moore [59] and Shi [80] have formulated this hypothesis with a model
that places two equity-market frictions at the center. One is the difficulty to issue
new equity: a firm can issue new equity to finance at most a fraction of intended
investment. The other friction is the lack of ability to resell existing equity. However,
issuing new equity is just one channel for a limit number of firms to finance their
investment, while a large number of firms borrow the funds they need for intended
investment from financial intermediaries. Meanwhile, these firms face a borrowing
constraints during the process, as non-financial firms use their market value of capital
as collateral.
In this paper, households do not hold capital and do not supply funds directly
to non-financial firms. Instead, they provide funds to banks which act as the liq-
uidity provider, and non-financial firms borrow from banks to satisfy their liquidity
demand. In addition to introducing financial intermediaries in the economy, this
paper introduces two kinds of financial frictions. The first one is the friction between
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financial intermediaries and households. As Hellmann[49] state, moral hazard in the
banking system plays a critical role in a financial crisis, and abolishing formal de-
posit insurance systems does not itself solve this agency problem. Since bankers use
funds obtained from depositors to make the lending decision, bankers have an incen-
tive to select a more risky asset portfolio which earns high profits if the investment
succeeds, while depositors suffer from losses when the investment fails (Kane[53];
Cole[23]). Therefore, households prefer to limit bankers’ ability to obtain funds.
The other friction is between financial intermediaries and non-financial firms. In
the beginning of each period, non-financial firms need to pay wages and get invest-
ment funds before they receive the revenue of production. In order to pay for these
operating expenses, entrepreneurs who own firms can use the internal funds accu-
mulated in previous periods, and external funds borrowed from banks by using the
market value of the firms as collateral. Geanakoplos[39] points out, in time of crisis,
compared with the interest rate, the collateral rate is playing more important role,
and a shock to the collateral rate will indeed influence the real economy. Gilchrist[43]
empirically show that credit market shocks, which result from deterioration in the
supply of credit due to weak balance sheets of firms or the disruptions in the health
of banks that supply credit, have been an important factor for U.S. business cycle
fluctuation during the 1990-2008 period and account for more than 30% of the vari-
ation in economic activity as measured by industrial production. Mimir[70] finds
that the leverage ratio is acyclical, while liabilities and equity are procyclical and
the credit spread is countercyclical. Moreover, drops in stock prices will reduce the
non-financial firms’ ability to finance even though they are not receiving the external
funds via issuing new equity.
The paper is part of a recent and growing literature which attemps to model the
financial intermediaries as an active agent in the economy. Most closely related to my
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work are Curdia and Woodford[25], Gertler and Karadi[40], Gertler and Kiyotaki [41]
and Gertler et.al[42]. Based on the traditional New Keynesian Model, Curdia and
Woodford[25] allow for the existence of interest gap between savers and borrowers.
However, they do not consider the agency problem which is arose by introducing
financial intermediaries in the economy. Gertler and Karadi[40] develop a monetary
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with involving financial intermediaries
which need to confront endogenously determined balance sheet constraints. Based
on Gertler and Karadi[40], Gertler and Kiyotaki[41] and Gertler et.al[42] consider the
financial friction between the bankers and households similar to mine, and explain
why banks would use so risky balance sheet originally. They assume that non-
financial firms can only issue new equity to finance investment and they do not
consider the financial friction between non-financial firms and banks. In my paper,
I regard this existing financial friction which limits non-financial firms ability to
borrow, just as facing a liquidity constraint.
The rationale for liquidity constraints in my model is related to the one in Kiy-
otaki and Moore[58] who have supplied a theory to understand how shocks to credit-
constrained firms are amplified. Kiyotaki and Moore[59] extend the model of a mon-
etary economy where there are differences in liquidity across assets and investigate
how aggregate activity and asset prices fluctuate with shocks to productivity and
liquidity. Based on this, Shi[80] finds that for equity price to fall as it typically does
in a recession, a negative liquidity shock must be accompanied or caused by other
shocks that relax firms’ financing constraint on investment. The main characteristic
between the above models and mine is that the assumption that firms’ financing
constraints are exogenous variables and they did not consider the role of financial
intermediaries in the economy.
Gorton and Winton[48] and Brunnermeier and Eisenbach[15] state that finan-
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cial intermediaries act as liquidity providers in the economy, building upon the
Bernanke and Gertler[12]. They find that the financial frictions between banks and
non-financial firms lead to persistence and non-linear amplification effects. However,
they did not consider the problem that can be brought by banks themselves, which is
the classical principal-agency problem between bankers and households. This moral
hazard problem will limit financial intermediaries’ ability to obtain deposits from
households, which has effect on the supply side of the market for loanable funds,
thereby affect the investment and output.
The basic logic in this paper is as follow: banks are playing an even more impor-
tant role in the modern economy, especially as liquidity providers for non-financial
firms. While non-financial firms need to borrow from banks to pay the operating
expense such as wages and investments, they can use their firms’ market value as
collateral to obtain the external funds which can explain the phenomenon between
stock prices and investment level. On the other hand, the existence of banks in the
economy will give rise to agency problems. The main contribution of this section is
to construct a theoretical model to consider frictions between financial intermediaries
and other individuals in the economy. This model formulates households, bankers
and entrepreneurs’ decisions in the monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
framework with nominal rigidities, and determines the competitive equilibriums. By
calibrating the model with a negative collateral shock, a negative productivity shock
and a positive shock to bankers’ divert rate, this paper finds that a negative collat-
eral shock which tightens firms’ financing constraints on investment can generate an
equity price boom which is different from what is observed in recessions. Therefore,
a collateral shock is not the primary driving force of the business cycle, while a neg-
ative productivity shock and bankers’ moral hazard problem are important aspects
to explain current economy. This section proceeds as follows. In section 2, I outline
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the environment and describe the equilibrium. Then, I drive the optimal conditions
for households, bankers and entrepreneurs, and get the propositions. In section 3, I
calibrate the model with three different shocks. In section 4, I conclude.
4.2 The Model
In the economy, there exists three kinds of individuals: workers, bankers and
entrepreneurs. The basic framework is the monetary dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with nominal rigidities developed by Christiano et.al[22],
Sveen and Weinke[82] and Smets and Wouters[81]. Basis on these, I introduce fi-
nancial intermediaries into the economy and the principal-agent problem between
bankers and households limits the financial intermediaries’ ability to acquire funds
from households, which is close to the models in Gertler and Kiyotaki[41] and Gertler
et.al[42]. Households do not have investment opportunities besides saving in finan-
cial intermediations, and cannot borrow against their future labor incomes, which
means that households face a liquidity constraint each period. As in the traditional
monopolistic competitive economy, there exist one unit of firms. Each firm produces
goods by using classical Cobb-Douglas production function. Similar to Bernanke and
Gertler[12] and Fiore et.al[34], entrepreneurs, who are risk neutral, need to pay the
wage and make investment decision in advance to get the revenue from production.
In order to finance the liquidity, the entrepreneurs use the accumulated net worth
from previous periods and the market value of firms’ capital levels as collateral to
borrow the needed funds from financial intermediaries.
If we do not consider financial intermediaries and there were no financial frictions
in the economy, the equilibrium is the same as a solution of the social planner’s
problem in the standard DSGE model which chooses the series of {Ct, Lt, It} as a
function of state variables {Kt, At} in oder to maximize the total welfare subject to
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the resource constraints. In the section, we use this frictionless DSGE economy as a
benchmark to which can be used to compare with the economy which exists financial
frictions.
To be more specific about the timing of events, we decompose each period into
three subperiods. Aggregate shocks and the idiosyncratic collateral ratio shock re-
vealed in the first subperiod. Non-financial firms know whether they can re-optimize
their price level or not, hire labor supplied by workers and pay their wage bills
and collect the funds for investment. They use internal funds brought in from the
previous period, and external funds borrowed from financial intermediaries. In the
second subperiod, non-financial firms enter into production and sell the outcome
of production and buy the goods for investment. Entrepreneurs need to pay tax
for their consumptions while households purchase consumption goods and pay lump
sum taxes. Entrepreneurs pay debts back to banks and workers make the deposits
in the last subperiod.
In the following, I will introduce the households, financial intermediaries and
non-financial firms in details and study the consequences for their activities.
4.2.1 Households
Assume that households can not supply the funds for non-financial firms directly,
which means they only lend to firms via financial intermediaries. Based on Gertler
and Karadi[40], in period t, a representative household with a continuum of members
of unit mass, who lives for infinite time periods, chooses aggregate consumption Ct
and labor supply Lt in the competitive market, and make deposits in the financial
intermediaries. As in [30], the household seeks to maximize the total expected utility
Et
∞∑
j=0
βjU(Ct+j, Lt+j). (4.1)
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Here, UC > 0, UL, UCC , ULL < 0, UCL = 0, the discount rate β ∈ (0, 1), and Ct
denotes the aggregate consumption level at time t, which is
Ct = (
∫ 1
0
Ct(i)
ε−1
ε di)
ε
ε−1 , (4.2)
where ε ≥ 1 is the rate of substitution elasticity between different kinds of goods
Ct(i).
Households take the aggregate price level Pt and the composite goods prices Pt(i)
as given and beyond their control. The household need to deal with the following
minimizing problem:
min
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Ct(i)di (4.3)
subject to
(
∫ 1
0
Ct(i)
ε−1
ε di)
ε
ε−1 ≥ Ct, (4.4)
where Pt(i) is the price of good i. After solving the problem, the household’s demand
for good i can then be written as:
Ct(i) = (
Pt(i)
Pt
)−εCt, (4.5)
here the aggregate price index Pt = (
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−εdi)
1
1−ε 2.
In particular, there exists two kinds of members in each household, which are
workers and bankers. The proportion 1−f of the members are workers and the other
proportion f are bankers.3While each worker supplies labor in the competitive labor
2The price elasticity of demand for good i is equal to ε. If ε → ∞, there would exist more
substitutes for each specific goods, and as a result, it is similar to the competitive economy.
3The number of workers in a household is far more than the number of bankers, which implies
f < 1− f .
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market and receives the payment which belongs to the whole household, bankers
administer a specific financial intermediation and return any nonnegative earnings
to the big family. Therefore, the household effectively owns the intermediation that
its bankers administer. However, the household’s deposits can not be put in the
financial intermediation that it owns. This assumption guarantees the bank can
make decision independently and the banker maximizes its own net worth other
than their utility since the depositors and the owners of the bank are two different
group of individuals.
At any moment of time t, the members in a representative household can switch
casually between the two occupations. If the member in this period is A banker, he
can still be a banker in the next period with a fixed possibility θ. Hence, on average, a
banker can live for 1
1−θ in any given period, which is finite but may be quite long
4. In
each period, the fraction of (1− θ)f bankers quite and turn into workers, meanwhile
the same amount of workers are randomly picked and become bankers so that the
relative amount of bankers and workers are stable over time. Bankers who exit from
the financial intermediation turn their accumulated net worth to their household
that they belong to, while the household supplies certain limited start-up funds for
the new bankers.
While households supply funds to banks rather than hold capital by their own
nor do they provide capital to non-financial firms directly, they just simply make
the deposits in the banks. Since both deposits and government debt’s maturity is
just one period bonds which are both riskless, the deposits and government debt are
perfect substitutes in our economy. At period t, the household chooses {Ct, Lt, Dt}
to maximize the total expected welfare (4.1) subject to the following sequence of
4In order to make sure that the bankers do not reach certain period when they can finance
all funds from their own net worth other than deposits, the bankers are not living with infinitely
periods.
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budget constraints:
PtCt +Dt = WtLt +R
d
tDt−1 + Πt − Tt. (4.6)
Here Wt denotes the wage rate, R
d
t is the nominal interest rate, Πt is the net dis-
tributions from ownership of banks, and Tt is the lump sum taxes. In each period,
since households can not finance their present consumptions from their future labor
incomes, they also face the borrowing constraint in each period, which means that:
Dt ≥ 0. (4.7)
The household’s optimal conditions are as follows:
Wt
Pt
UCt = −ULt, (4.8)
UCt ≥ βEtR
d
t+1UC,t+1
1 + pit+1
= βEt(1 + r
d
t+1)UC,t+1. (4.9)
Here, pit+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
− 1 is the inflation rate in period t+ 1, 1 + rdt+1 = R
d
t+1
1+pit+1
is the real
interest rate, UCt denotes the marginal utility of consumption and ULt is the marginal
dis-utility of labor. Equation (4.8) states the intratemporal optimal condition, and
equation (4.9) is the Euler equation which can only be equalized if the borrowing
constraint (4.7)is not binding.
Assumption 7 For any t, β < 1
1+rdt
.
Let 1 + rd0,t = Π
t
i=0(1 + r
d
t ), within equation (4.9), for any t, we know that β
t(1 +
rd0,t)UCt is a bounded supermartingale. If β(1 + r
d
t ) < 1, which denotes that the
household is relatively impatient given the interest rate, then βt(1 + rd0,t)UCtwill
convergence based on Doob’s convergence theorem, and it means that consumption
55
Ct and deposits Dt will not diverge. Actually,
1
1+rdt
is entrepreneurs’ discount rate, if
there is no uncertainty in the economy, in the steady state, households will consume
their labor income and do not save at all since they are impatient.
4.2.2 Financial Intermediaries
In each period, the financial intermediaries obtain funds from households and
their own net worth which is treated as inside equity. At beginning of period t, as
all the funds can be used as loans to non-financial firms, the balance sheet identity
of a financial intermediation is:
dst = Dt + nt, (4.10)
where dst denotes the amount of loanable funds supplied by a typical bank and nt is
the banker’s net worth.
The household saves his deposits into bank at the end of previous period and
obtains the nominal interest rate Rdt at the end of period t, which means Dt is the
liability of the bank and nt is its equity. Respectively, at the end of period t, the bank
receives the nominal return rate Rlt from its lending. Since R
l
t ≥ Rdt , the bankers
always have the incentive to engage in financial intermediaries. The law of motion
for the bank’s bet worth is :
nt+1 = R
l
td
s
t −RdtDt. (4.11)
Using the balance sheet of banks given by equation (4.10), we can re-write equation
(4.11) as follows:
nt+1 = (R
l
t −Rdt )dst +Rdtnt. (4.12)
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The bank’s net worth relies on the premium Rlt − Rdt that earns on the amounts
supplied in the loanable funds market.
In period t+ j, if the following inequality holds, the bank will always have incen-
tive to lend out:
Etβ
jΛt,t+j(R
l
t+j −Rdt+j) ≥ 0, i ≥ 0, (4.13)
where Λt,t+j =
UC,t+j
UCt
. In a perfect financial market, the return on loans is always
equal to the cost of deposits, which means the interest rate spread is zero. However,
if the financial market is imperfect, the interest rate gap is positive since bankers can
not obtain funds as much as their want. Justiniano et.al [52] supplies the evidence
that this premium is highly countercyclical and was widely increased during the
recent recession.
At the beginning of period t, the bank’s objective is to maximize the expected
discounted terminal net worth, which is5
Nt = Et
∞∑
j=0
(1− θ)θjβjΛt,t+jnt+j. (4.14)
Since the premium βjΛt,t+j(R
l
t+j−Rdt+j) is positive, bankers will always have the
incentive to receive more deposits from households. In order to set a limit on its
ability to do so, the economy involves the the agency problem. At the end of the
period, after obtaining funds from households, the banker can choose to divert ϕ
fraction of assets to satisfy his family’s consumption. If the banker chooses to do
so, he can not be a banker any more. Thus, the cost that the banker need to face
is that the depositors can drive the bank into bankruptcy and obtain the remaining
5As bankers face financing constraints, they have incentive to keep all earning in the banks’
account until they can not be banker any more.
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proportion 1− ϕ of assets.
Since the banker can divert the fund in each period and if the banker does not
have incentive to do so, the following incentive constraint must be satisfied:
Nt ≥ ϕdst . (4.15)
The left hand side of the above equation is the value of operating for the bank, which
would lose if the banker diverts a fraction of assets. The right hand side denotes the
gain from doing so.
Accordingly, the bank chooses dst to maximize the expected discounted terminal
net worth (4.14) subject to the law of motion for net worth (4.12) and the incentive
constraint (4.15).
Proposition 4 The expected discounted terminal net worth can be expressed as the
discounted total return to its loan to firms and the expected discounted total return
to its existing net worth, which means that
Nt = νtd
s
t + ηtnt, (4.16)
where xt,t+j =
dst+j
dst
and zt,t+j =
nt+j
nt
νt = (1− θ)(Rlt −Rdt ) + Et[θβΛt,t+1xt,t+1vt+1],
ηt = (1− θ)Rdt + Et[θβΛt,t+1zt,t+1ηt+1].
(4.17)
The proof of the above proposition is contained in Appendix C. In equation
(4.16), νt denotes the expected discounted marginal gain to the bank of supplying
one more unit of loan, while ηt is regarded as the expected discounted marginal
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benefit of having one extra amount of net worth. As shown in Appendix C, the in-
centive constraint (4.15) is always binding which limits the leverage of the bank, thus:
dst =
ηtnt
ϕ− νt . (4.18)
Combing with equation (4.10), the bank’s leverage ratio is as follows:
Dt
nt
=
ηt
ϕ− νt − 1. (4.19)
Based on the above equation, we can find that the leverage ratio is an increasing
function of the expected marginal return of receiving one more amount of deposits
νt and having one extra amount of net worth ηt. Meanwhile, it is also a decreasing
function of diverting fraction rate ϕ. Intuitively, if the marginal returns increases,
bankers have less incentive to divert funds today, which will give households more
willings to entrust the bankers, and the decreasing of diverting fraction rate will also
have the same effect.
At the beginning of the next period, as only θ of financial inter mediations still
survive, the intermediaries’ aggregate net worth n¯t at period t + 1 is constructed
by two parts. One part is the total amount of existing financial intermediaries’ net
worth, while the other part is the sum of the net worth of newly entering financial
intermediaries. Households supply start-up funds for the related financial interme-
diaries, which are supposed to be 
1−θ . Combing with equation (4.12) ,(4.18) and
(4.19), we have intermediaries’ aggregate net worth n¯t+1:
n¯t+1 = θ[(R
l
t −Rdt )
ηt
ϕ− νt +R
d
t ]n¯t + n¯t. (4.20)
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4.2.3 Non-financial Firms
The assumptions on the entrepreneurs are as in Bernanke and Gertler [12] and
Fiore et.al [34]. There is a continuum one unit of monopolistically competitive firms
which are owned by specific entrepreneurs. They are risk neutral and have linear
preferences over consumption with time preference βe = 1
1+rd
. Their total expected
utility function is:
Et
∞∑
j=0
(βe)jCet+j. (4.21)
Here Cet+j is the entrepreneur’s aggregate consumption. In each period t, entrepreneurs
can choose whether use the accumulated internal funds Mt to buy the consumption
goods or not. One more unit of consumption at t, means that there will be less 1 + τ
units of real internal funds to be available for production at next period. These funds
earn expected return
Rlt+1
(1+pit+1)(1+τ)
units of consumption at t + 1. Since Rlt+1 > R
d
t+1
and βe = 1
1+rd
, we have:
(1 + τ)βeEt
Rlt+1
(1 + pit+1)(1 + τ)
> 1, (4.22)
then it is better to postpone consumption as they are more patient compared with
households. Moreover, the decision does not depend on the consumption tax rate 6.
Therefore, the entrepreneur’s object is to maximize the accumulated internal funds
which is the market value of the firm.
6Here, I just consider a special case in which entrepreneurs’ consumptions are fully taxed. The
extremely high tax rate will lead the consumption of entrepreneurs to approach zero. Actually, even
though I introduce entrepreneurs in the economy, I do not treat them as actual individuals, just as a
method to introduce the financial friction between non-financial firms and financial intermediation,
which is the main objective of this section.
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Each firm i’s production function is:
Yt(i) = At(i)(Kt(i))
α(Lt(i))
1−α, (4.23)
here α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share in the production function, At(i) follows a station-
ary stochastic process which is common knowledge to all entrepreneurs and realized
in the beginning of each period, Kt(i) and Lt(i) represent firm i’s accumulated capital
level and labor input used in producting Yt(i).
Following Woodford [88], I assume that there are two kinds of restrictions on
capital accumulation. Firstly, the investment in capital can be used to produce
in the next period other than this period. Secondly, the capital adjustment cost
function is convex. Thus, we can write the investment function as follow:
It(i) = f(
Kt+1(i)
Kt(i)
)Kt(i), (4.24)
here It(i) is the quantity of investment goods purchased by firm i
7. The function
f(.) satisfies the following condition: f(1) = δ ∈ (0, 1), f ′(1) = 1, and f ′′(1) = ξ > 0.
Parameter δ is capital’s depreciation rate, and ξ is the elasticity of the investment-
to-capital ratio which is strictly larger than zero.
The entrepreneur i joins into period t with capital level Kt(i) and accumulated
internal funds Mt(i). As in [58] and [75], the entrepreneur need to pay the wage and
make investment decision in advance to receive the revenue from production, and he
or she need to use the market value of capital as collateral to borrow external funds
from banks. The firm i have the internal funds Mt(i) and the amount it need to
7The investment goods is the same as the aggregate consumption bundles.
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borrow is dt(i) = WtLt(i) + PtIt(i)−Mt(i), and the collateral constraint:
Rlt(WtLt(i) + PtIt(i)−Mt(i)) ≤ ψt(i)Et[Qt+1(i)Kt+1(i)]. (4.25)
Here, Rlt is the lending interest rate, Qt+1(i) is the market price of capital in currency
units, and ψt(i) is a collateral rate shock which is a way to denote the tightness in
the credit market. Following Liu et.al[65], if the owners of non-financial firms are
unable to pay the debt back, this bank can seize the accumulated capital and own
the non-financial firm. Meanwhile, it is costly to sell the capital stock, the banker
at most would like to lend a fraction ψt(i) of the total value of collateral assets. The
ψt(i) follows the stochastic process:
logψt(i) = (1− ρ)logψ¯(i) + ρlogψt−1(i) + ψit, (4.26)
where ψ¯(i) is the average value of ψt(i), ρ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the persistence, and ψit
is an i.i.d white noise process with mean zero and variance σ2ψi.
Assume the staggered price setting as in Calvo [17] and Yun [90]: in the beginning
of each period, every firm can re-optimize its price level with probability 1−ω which
is exogenous and constant over. Thus, at time t, firm i’s nominal price Pt(i) is either
P ∗t−1(i) with probability ω or the price P
∗
t (i) with probability 1− ω.
As discussed in the household’s cost minimization problem, the demand for each
individual goods i in period t is:
Y dt (i) = (
Pt(i)
Pt
)−εY dt , (4.27)
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where Y dt is the aggregate demand at time t, which is:
Y dt = Ct + It +Gt,
where Gt is the government expenditure and It ≡
∫ 1
0
It(i)di means the aggregate
investment level.
Define QtKt(i) = V (Kt(i),Mt(i), Pt−1(i)), which is the nominal value function
of firm i joining into period t. Since in the beginning of period t, the entrepreneur
i has already known whether he can re-optimize or not before borrow the external
funds for banks, he will make different choice when he can control the price level.
Let L∗t (i) and I
∗
t (i) respectively be the labor demand and investment level when the
price level is P ∗t (i). The entrepreneur chooses {Lt(i), Kt+1(i), L∗t (i), K∗t+1(i), P ∗t (i)}
to maximize:
V (Kt(i),Mt(i), Pt−1(i))
Pt
= ω[
Pt−1(i)Yt(i)
Pt
− R
l
tdt(i)
Pt
+ βeEt
V (Kt+1(i),Mt+1(i), Pt−1(i))
Pt+1
]
+(1− ω)[P
∗
t (i)Y
∗
t (i)
Pt
− R
l
td
∗
t (i)
Pt
+ βeEt
V (K∗t+1(i),M
∗
t+1(i), P
∗
t (i))
Pt+1
],
(4.28)
subject to production function (4.23), capital motion equation (4.24), collateral con-
straint (4.25) and demand function (4.27). In equation (4.28), V (Kt+1(i),Mt+1(i), Pt−1(i))
denotes the value function in next period if the firm can not re-optimize its price
level, while V (K∗t+1(i),M
∗
t+1(i), P
∗
t (i)) is the value function if the firm can optimally
choose price level. The Mt+1(i) and M
∗
t+1(i) are expressed as follows:
Mt+1(i) = Pt−1(i)Yt(i)−Rltdt(i),
M∗t+1(i) = P
∗
t (i)Y
∗
t (i)−Rltd∗t (i).
(4.29)
The detailed steps in solving the firm’s problem are in Appendix C.
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Lemma 1 When the collateral constraint is binding, the labor demand level is lower
than in the frictionless economy.
The existence of collateral constraint will lead the entrepreneur to face more con-
straints when he makes the decision, and we have:
Pt−1(i)YLt(i)
Pt
≥ R
l
tWt
Pt
,
(1− 1
ε
)P ∗t (i)Y
∗
Lt(i)
Pt
≥ R
l
tWt
Pt
.
(4.30)
From the above two inequalities, even though the marginal benefit of adding one
extra unit of labor is no less than the marginal cost, which means that the firm can
gain extra profit from increasing the labor input, the firm can not do so because of
facing the collateral constraint.
If the collateral constraint is not binding, we can have the first-order condition
for price setting as follows:
∞∑
j=0
(ωβe)jEt{Yt+j(i)
Pt+j
[P ∗t (i)−
ε
ε− 1MCt+j(i)]} = 0, (4.31)
where MCt(i) means the nominal marginal cost of firm i at period t. By solving firm
i’s cost minimization problem, the expression of MCt(i) is :
MCt(i) =
Wt ∗Rlt
YLt(i)
, (4.32)
where YLt(i) is the marginal production of labor. Since the chosen price can be
still used as the firms’ future price level, they not only need to consider the current
expected marginal cost but also need to take into account the future’s which is
included in the equation (4.31).
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4.2.4 Equilibrium
In the economy, the government’s budget constraint is
PtGt = Mt+1 −Mt + Tt, (4.33)
where Mt denotes the money supply at time t.
For all i ∈ (0, 1), given the exogenous process {At, ψt(i)}∞t=0, the policy processes
{Tt}∞t=0, the government spending {Gt}∞t=0, and initial conditions {M0(i), K0(i)}, a
competitive equilibrium of this economy is a collection of {Ct(i), Lt, Lt(i), Kt(i), Rdt , Rlt,
Dt, d
s
t , dt, It(i),Mt(i),Mt, Pt, Pt(i),Wt}∞t=0 such that:
(i) households choose {Ct, Lt, Dt} to maximize the total expected discounted
utility subject to the budget constraint and borrowing constraint, taking the prices
{Pt(i), Pt, Rdt ,Wt} and the policy processes as given; bankers choose {dst} to maximize
the expected discounted terminal net worth subject to the incentive constraint, and
entrepreneurs optimize {Lt(i), It(i), L∗t (i), I∗t (i), P ∗t (i)} to maximize total discount
value subject to the collateral constraints by taking {Rdt , Rlt} as given.
(ii) All the markets are clear: the labor market
∫ 1
0
Lt(i)di = Lt; the goods market;
the money
∫ 1
0
Mt(i)di = Mt; the loanable funds d
s
t =
∫ 1
0
dt(i)di .
(iii) Government budget constraints hold every period.
(iv) Resource constraint: Yt = Ct + It +Gt.
Since in each period, the fraction 1− ω of firms re-optimize their price level and
the remaining firms still use the same price level as previous period, the aggregate
price is decided by these two kinds of price levels. However, since firms were randomly
chosen from the pool of all firms, the average price of firms which are not selected to
adjust their price is the average price of all firms that prevailed in previous period.
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Thus, aggregate index Pt = (
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−εdi)
1
1−ε can also be written as:
P 1−εt = (1− ω)(P ∗t (i))1−ε + ωP 1−εt−1 . (4.34)
By approximating equation (4.31) and (4.34) around steady-state equilibrium which
the inflation is zero, we can have the expression for inflation as follow:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κm̂ct, (4.35)
where pit = log(Pt)−log(Pt−1), κ is a decreasing function of the fraction of firms which
can not adjust price levels each period, nominal marginal cost mct ≡
∫ 1
0
MCt(i)
Pt
di, and
m̂ct means the real marginal cost’s percentage deviation from the steady-state
8. We
can treat equation (4.35) as the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, which implies that
real marginal cost is the right driving force for the inflation and the inflation process
is forward-looking as a firm cares more about the inflation in the future when it sets
its price level.
4.3 Model Analysis
In order to examine how the economy responds collateral shocks and technology
shocks, I calibrate the model based on Gertler and Karadi [40], Kiyotaki and Moore
[59] and Sveen and Weinke [83].
4.3.1 Calibration
The utility function and capital adjustment function used for quantitative analysis
are:
U(C,L) = log(C) + Ψlog(1− L), (4.36)
8See Sveen and Weinke [82] and [83] for the detailed calculation process.
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f(
Kt+1(i)
Kt(i)
) =
Kt+1(i)
Kt(i)
− 1 + ξ
2
(
Kt+1(i)
Kt(i)
− 1)2 + δ. (4.37)
You can find the choice of parameter in Table C.2. Since I consider the quarterly data,
the discount factor β is chosen as 0.99 in order to match the U.S. avergage annual real
interest rate which is 4%. The relative utility weight of labor is determined so that
the steady-state value of L is 0.33. As estimated in Gali et.al [37], ε = 11 implies
a frictionless makeup of 10%. The fraction of fund ϕ which can be diverted, the
percentage tansfer to new borned bankers  and the survival probability θ, are chose
to match the specific targets, just as stated in Gertler and Karadi [40]9. Turning to
non-financial firms, the price stickiness parameter ω = 0.779 is often considered to be
empirically plausible.10 The parameter premultiplying the marginal cost in equation
(4.35) is ((1− βeω)(1− ω)/ω)(1− α)(1− α + αε).
In the model, there exists productivity shocks, collateral shocks and bankers’
diverting shocks which I consider separately. The technology At follows the stochastic
process:
logAt = ρalog(At−1) + at , (4.38)
where at∼N(0, σa). I set the quarterly autoregressive factor ρa to 0.96 which is
commonly used in the literature, and the standard deviation of shocks is 0.0038. The
stochastic process of collateral shock ψt(i) is treated as equation (4.26). Following
Liu et.al [65], the average value of collateral ratio is 0.75, the persistence of collateral
ratio shocks is 0.979 and the standard deviation is 0.0126 which are estimated by
using the Bayesian method to match their model to quarterly U.S data. Moreover,
9In the steady-state, the interest rate spread is 100 basis points, and the average suivival time
of bank is eight years.
10Sveen and Weinke [83] points out that the micro evidence on price adjustment is mixed.
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the bankers’ diverting rate ϕ shock is an i.i.d shock:
log(ϕt) = 
ϕ
t , (4.39)
where ϕt ∼N(0, σϕ). I choose the standard deviation of the shock σϕ = 0.001713 so
that the value of diverting rate will increase 10% when one unit standard deviation
shock happens.
Furthermore, all these shocks are uncorrelated in the model such that we could
find out their specific effects.
4.3.2 Experiments
In order to classify the effects arose by the different shocks, I introduce the three
kinds of shocks to the model separately. All the figures show the deviations of these
variables from the steady state values. Figure C.3 shows the impulse responses
to a one-time, one-standard deviation negative shock to collateral ratio ϕ. The
negative collateral shock increases the investment cost and the interest rate spread,
which lead the stock price to rise. On one hand, compared with the steady state,
because of the negative collateral shock, the external funds that firms can borrow
from banks is lower. On the other hand, as the stock price is higher, it allows
the firms’ capital to be more valuable which mitigates the negative effect and the
collateral constraint becomes less tight. Furthermore, entrepreneurs spend more
expenditure in investment which lowers households’ labor income, even though their
labor supply is higher.
Figure C.4 presents the impulse responses to a negative shock to productivity.
Since the negative technology shock reduces the marginal productivity of capital, the
stock price is lower which makes investment to be less profitable for entrepreneurs.
As we can observed from Figure C.4, during the first 4 years, stock price, invest-
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ment and capital level’s deviations from steady state are increasing. Meanwhile, as
households can not borrow from the banks, the negative productivity shock low-
ers the marginal production of labor and real wage, which in turn, decreases the
consumption significantly and induces households to supply more labor. Moreover,
banks have difficulty in obtaining deposits from households since marginal utility of
consumption is higher. It is result in the decreasing in their leverage ratio, which
means the productivity shocks generates a procyclical leverage ratio.
Figure C.5 shows the impulse response to a positive shock to bankers’ divert rate.
If the divert fraction ϕ increases, bankers can steal more proportion of money which
means that there exists more severe moral hazard problem. In order to convince
households to save, bankers have to pay higher interest rate for deposits, which dom-
inates the other effects and rises the leverage ratio. However, since bankers divert
funds to their specific households which increases their income, with regarding the
income effect, households’ consumption is higher and labor supply is lower temporar-
ily, which reduce the amount of loanable funds in the market and also the investment
level. As a result, the production is lower. Without double, the situation with higher
consumption level and lower labor supply can not last for a long time which we can
find out from the figure.
These responses are broadly consistent with historical data depicted in Figure
C.1 and Figure C.2, although some of the responses do not match in the magnitude.
The consistency suggests that productivity shocks are critical aspects to explain the
cyclical behavior of stock prices with other macro variables. If productivity shocks
are the only shocks, then stock prices would fall and banks’ financing ability becomes
worse in response to a negative productivity shock. Meanwhile, positive shocks to
bankers’ divert rate can also be used to explain the phenomenons. Even though the
reducing in stock prices and outputs is along with higher consumptions, it is mainly
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result from the bankers’ diverting. By taking into account this effect, bankers’ moral
hazard problem is also important in explaining the cyclical behaviors. Since I have
not considered the wage rigidity in the model, the absence of it may imply that labor
and output do not fall enough as wage is flexible and can be adjusted without any
cost, which may be the reason why labor and output level are increasing after the
negative collateral shock.
4.4 Conclusion
In order to analyze the financial crisis of 2007-2010, Kocherlakota [63] points out
DSGE models need to incorporate both stickiness and financial market frictions. In
this paper, I introduce financial intermediaries in the DSGE framework with regard-
ing the nominal rigidities. Accordingly, I consider two kinds of financial frictions
between financial intermediaries and other individuals. The first one is the moral
hazard problem between financial intermediaries and households as bankers are not
using their own funds to make the investment. The other one is the collateral con-
straint when firms need to borrow external funds from banks. By calibrating the
model with three separate shocks which are a negative collateral shock, a negative
productivity shock and a positive shock to bankers’ divert rate, I find that compared
with the negative collateral shock, the negative productivity shock and bankers’
moral hazard problem are more important aspects. Moreover, it provides a note of
caution for policymakers: they should find the reasons of the shortfall in liquidity
other than simply pumping liquidity into the market. On one hand, if firms’ shortfall
in liquidity is not generated by the fundamental events, it is a good policy for gov-
ernment to supply liquidity to them. If firms’ shortfall in liquidity is generated by
productivity, it is not reasonable for government to do so. Moreover, for the purpose
of mitigating bankers’ moral hazard problem, government need to strengthen the su-
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pervision of the financial intermediaries, especially in the recession because bankers
have more incentive to divert assets during this period.
This paper could be extended into two directions. Firstly, we could use the
framework of this paper to have the policy analysis. In the financial crisis, the
government normally provide the liquidity for banks. Within considering the moral
hazard problem, this policy seems a bad idea. Secondly, as financial intermediaries
act as liquidity providers in the economy, supplying the microfoundations of the
agency problem between bankers, households and entrepreneurs, such as that in
Diamond and Dybvig [27] and Farhi and Tirole [33], represents a promising avenue
for future research.
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5. CONCLUSION
In short, on one hand, my work focuses on the optimal conduct of fiscal and
monetary policy in the dynamic economy by introducing heterogeneity and private
information, and it uses the basic framework of the new dynamic public finance lit-
erature which builds on the tradition of Mirrlees [71]. On the other hand and more
importantly, my work mainly try to explain some phenomenons happened in the re-
cent financial crisis by emphasizing the financial intermediaries’ role in the economy,
and studies financial frictions arise between financial sectors and other individuals.
I could use the framework in Section 4 to have the policy analysis. In the financial
crisis, the government normally provide the liquidity for banks. Within considering
the moral hazard problem, this policy seems a bad idea. Moreover, as financial inter-
mediaries act as liquidity providers in the economy, supplying the microfoundations
of the agency problem between bankers, households and entrepreneurs, such as that
in Diamond and Dybvig [27] and Farhi and Tirole [33], represents a promising avenue
for future research, which is also my research goals during period of affiliation.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX OF SECTION 2
Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008
Argentina 26.4 21.1 17.1 13 9.9 8
Brazil 55.1 44.2 32.6 25.2 18.8 14.42
China 84 82.6 80.4 72.6 64.2 56.9
Indonesia 85.4 82.9 77.9 69.4 58 48.54
Malaysia 73.4 66.5 58 50.2 38 29.64
Mexico 49.2 41 33.7 28.6 25.3 22.8
Philippines 69.7 67 62.5 51.2 41.5 35.08
South Korea 72.3 59.3 43.3 26.2 20.4 18.54
Thailand 80.3 79.1 73.2 70.6 68.9 66.68
Table A.1: Share of Rural Population (%)
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In the economy with private information,the government as the social planner
solves the optimal program:
max
(cit,Nit,lit,xit,Iit)
∑
i=H,h
(
2∑
t=1
βt−1U(cit, 1−Nit − lit) + β2U(ci3, 1− li3)), (A.1)
s.t. equation(2.8) (2.9) (2.10) and (2.23).
Let λt, t = 1, 2.3 denote the Lagrange multipliers of the feasible conditions (2.8)
(2.9) (2.10), and µ denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the IC constraint (2.23),U∗
denotes the utility function when high ability agent pretends to be low ability agent.
The first order conditions are as follows:
cHt :β
t−1(1 + µ)
∂U(cHt, LHt)
∂cHt
= λt,
cht :β
t−1(1− µ)∂U(cht, Lht)
∂cht
= λt,
ylHt :
∂U(cHt, LHt)
∂LHt
1 + µ
HHt
= λt
∂F (KHt, y
l
Ht)
∂ylHt
ylht :
∂U(cht, Lht)
∂Lht
βt−1
HHt
= λt
∂F (Kht, y
l
ht)
∂ylht
+ µ
βt−1
HHt
∂U∗(cht, Lht)
∂Lht
yHH1 :(−
ULH1
HH1
+ βULH2
yHH2 + y
l
H2
(Hi2)2
∂HH2
∂yHH1
+ β2ULH3
ylH3
(HH3)2
∂HH3
∂HH2
∂HH2
∂yHH1
(1 + µ)
= − 1
1 + µ
β2ULh3
∂ylh3
∂yHi1
yHH2 :(−
ULH2
HH2
+ βULH3
ylH3
(HH3)2
∂HH3
∂yHH2
(1 + µ) = 0,
yHh1 :(−
ULh1
Hh1
+ βULh2
yHh2 + y
l
h2
(Hh2)2
∂Hh2
∂yHh1
+ β2ULh3
ylh3
(Hh3)2
∂Hh3
∂Hh2
∂Hh2
∂yHh1
− µ(−U
∗
LH1
HH1
+
βU∗LH2
yHh2 + y
l
h2
(HH2)2
∂HH2
∂yHh1
+ β2U∗LH3
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(H∗H3)2
∂H∗H3
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∂Hh2
∂yHh1
= 0,
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As for inequation (2.27), the optimal condition of ylht:
∂U(cht, Lht)
∂Lht
1
Hht
= λt
∂F (Kht, y
l
ht)
∂ylht
+
∂U∗(cht, Lht)
∂Lht
µ
HHt
. (A.2)
Other than initial period, the human capital of high ability agent is higher than
low ability agent, obviously, facing the same effective labor, high ability will work
less and enjoy more leisure, then we get ∂U(cht,Lht
∂Lht
1−µ
Hht
< λt
∂F (Kht,y
l
ht
∂ylht
.According to the
optimal condition of cht, we have the (2.27).
With considering the optimal condition of xh1, while U
∗
Lh2
< ULh2 , U
∗
Lh3
< ULh3 ,
and as for human capital accumulation, with the same inputs, the low ability agent’s
marginal production of physical capital and labor is higher than high ability agent,
it is easy to get (2.31) and (2.32).
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX OF SECTION 3
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose there exists some Kt < K
∗
t such that TV (Kt) = TV (K
∗
t ).
Let (x∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) be the solution of social planner’s problem SP (Kt), which
means that it satisfies the feasible conditions and the incentive-compatible condition.
Since Kt < K
∗
t and TV (Kt) = TV (K
∗
t ), (x
∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) also satisfies the con-
straints of social planner’s problem SP (K∗t ), then it is also the solution of SP (K
∗
t ).
While (x∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) satisfies the feasible conditions, then for all θt ∈ Θt, we
have:
∫
x∗tdµ(θ
t)+K∗t+1+G
∗
t ≤ F (Kt,
∫
h∗tdµ(θ
t))+(1−δ)Kt < F (K∗t ,
∫
h∗tdµ(θ
t))+(1−δ)K∗t .
For any  > 0, let x˜t = x
∗
t +

U ′ (x∗t )
, we have:
∫
x˜tdµ(θ
t) +K∗t+1 +G
∗
t < F (K
∗
t ,
∫
h∗tdµ(θ
t)) + (1− δ)K∗t .
which means that the feasible condition will always hold as long as  is small enough.
Therefore, (x˜t, h
∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) satisfies the feasible conditions of SP (K∗t ).
Meanwhile, for all θt ∈ Θt, we get:
U(x˜t)−h
∗
t
θt
+σ(u(q∗t )−
e∗t
θt
) = U(x∗t )+−
h∗t
θt
+σ(u(q∗t )−
e∗t
θt
) > U(x∗t )−
h∗t
θt
+σ(u(q∗t )−
e∗t
θt
),
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and
W˜ (ξ∗(θt); , h∗, q∗, e∗) > W˜ (ξ∗(θt);x∗, h∗, q∗, e∗).
While (x∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) satisfies the incentive-compatible condition of SP (K∗t ), then
W˜ (ξ∗(θt);x∗, h∗, q∗, e∗) ≥ W˜ (ξ;x∗, h∗, q∗, e∗) for any ξ ∈ Θt, hence, (x˜t, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗)
also satisfies the incentive-compatible condition of SP (K∗t ).
Thus,(x∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) could not be the solution of social planner’s problem
SP (K∗t ), which means that the assumption could not be true. So, TV (Kt) < TV (K
∗
t )
for all Kt < K
∗
t .
Proof of Proposition 2
Based on Proposition 1, as the function TV (Kt) is strictly increasing, we are able
to rewrite the maximization problem as minimization problem. In other words, we
need to solve the problem by minimizing the resources used in period t, which means
that the solution (x∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) of the problem should provide the same objective
value and use less initial resource than any other packages.
Suppose that there is a two-period deviation from (x∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) which guar-
antees that all individuals have the same utility level as does (x∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗).
Moreover, the deviation all satisfies the feasibility condition and is incentive-compatible.
We can express the problem as follows:
min
ψt,ςt,ϕt,ψt+1
∫
ψtdµ(θ
t) + ςt
subject to the feasible conditions in the night of period t:
∫
(q∗t + ϕt)dµ(θ
t) = f(
∫
e∗tdµ(θ
t), K∗t+1 + ςt), (B.1)
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and in the day of period t+ 1 is:
∫
(x∗t+1 + ψt+1)dµ(θ
t+1)+K∗t+2+Gt+1 = F (K
∗
t+1+ςt,
∫
htdµ(θ
t+1))+(1−δ)(K∗t+1+ςt).
(B.2)
and all individuals have the same utility level, which means:
U(x∗t + ψt)−
h∗t
θt
+ σ(u(q∗t + ϕt)−
e∗t
θt
) + β[U(x∗t+1 + ψt+1)−
h∗t+1
θt+1
+ σ(u(q∗t+1)−
e∗t+1
θt+1
)] = U(x∗t )−
h∗t
θt
+ σ(u(q∗t )−
e∗t
θt
)
+ β[U(x∗t+1)−
h∗t+1
θt+1
+ σ(u(q∗t+1)−
e∗t+1
θt+1
)].
(B.3)
Since the feasible conditions for (x∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) in the night of period t:
∫
q∗t dµ(θ
t) = f(
∫
e∗tdµ(θ
t), K∗t+1),
and in the day of period t+ 1
∫
x∗t+1dµ(θ
t+1) +K∗t+2 +Gt+1 = F (K
∗
t+1,
∫
htdµ(θ
t+1)) + (1− δ)(K∗t+1),
combing with the equation (B.1) and (B.2), we can rewrite the feasible conditions
as: ∫
ϕtdµ(θ
t) = f(
∫
e∗tdµ(θ
t), K∗t+1 + ςt)− f(
∫
e∗tdµ(θ
t), K∗t+1), (B.4)∫
ψt+1dµ(θ
t+1) = F (K∗t+1 + ςt,
∫
htdµ(θ
t+1))− F (K∗t+1,
∫
htdµ(θ
t+1)) + (1− δ)ςt.
(B.5)
Since (x∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) is the solution of social planner’s problem, we conjecture
that ψt = 0, ςt = 0, ϕt = 0, ψt+1 = 0 is the solution of the above problem.
Suppose not, and the element ψt, ςt, ϕt, ψt+1 satisfy the constraints and can lead a
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negative value for the objective of the minimizing problem. Define the new allocation
(x˜, h∗, K˜, q˜, e∗) as follows:
x˜ = x∗, K˜ = K∗, q˜ = q∗
for all the other periods, except that
x˜t = x
∗
t + ψt,
x˜t+1 = x
∗
t+1 + ψt+1,
K˜t+1 = K
∗
t+1 + ςt,
q˜t = q
∗
t + ϕt,
If the new allocation (x˜, h∗, K˜, q˜, e∗) satisfies the feasible conditions and incentive-
compatible condition, and can guarantee the same utility level, but uses less re-
sources, we can find out the contradiction. In the following, we need to show the
allocation is feasible and incentive-compatible separately.
At period t, in the CM, as
∫
ψtdµ(θ
t) + ςt < 0, we can have
∫
x˜tdµ(θ
t) +Gt + K˜t+1 =
∫
(x∗t + ψt)dµ(θ
t) +Gt +K
∗
t+1 + ςt
<
∫
x∗tdµ(θ
t) +Gt +K
∗
t+1.
(B.6)
Obviously, the allocation (x˜, h∗, K˜, q˜, e∗) is feasible.
Moreover, based on the equation (B.3), for all individuals and any period t, the
total utility is:
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W˜ (ξ;x, h, q, e) = Et
∞∑
i=0
βi{U(xt+i(ξ))− ht+i(ξ)
θt+i
+ σ(u(qt+i(ξ))− et+i(ξ)
θt+i
)}
= Et[U(x˜t)− h
∗
t
θt
+ σ(u(q˜t)− e
∗
t
θt
) + β[U(x˜t+1)− h
∗
t+1
θt+1
+ σ(u(q∗t+1)−
e∗t+1
θt+1
)] +
∞∑
i=2
βi{U(x∗t+i(ξ))−
h∗t+i(ξ)
θt+i
+ σ(u(q∗t+i(ξ))−
e∗t+i(ξ)
θt+i
)}]
= Et[U(x
∗
t )−
h∗t
θt
+ σ(u(q∗t )−
e∗t
θt
) + β[U(x∗t+1)−
h∗t+1
θt+1
+ σ(u(q∗t+1)−
e∗t+1
θt+1
)] +
∞∑
i=2
βi{U(x∗t+i(ξ))−
h∗t+i(ξ)
θt+i
+ σ(u(q∗t+i(ξ))−
e∗t+i(ξ)
θt+i
)}]
= Et[
∞∑
i=0
βi{U(x∗t+i(ξ))−
h∗t+i(ξ)
θt+i
+ σ(u(q∗t+i(ξ))−
e∗t+i(ξ)
θt+i
)}].
(B.7)
All individuals will have the same utility with the new allocation (x˜, h∗, K˜, q˜, e∗).
Therefore, it also satisfies incentive-compatible since (x∗, h∗, K∗, q∗, e∗) does.
The new allocation (x˜, h∗, K˜, q˜, e∗) is feasible and incentive-compatible, and can
achieve the same utility. More importantly, it uses less resource. However, it violates
the Proposition 1. Hence, ψt = 0, ςt = 0, ϕt = 0, ψt+1 = 0 must be the solution of
the minimization problem.
Right now, other than solving the social problem problem SP (Kt), we can get
the first-order condition by solving the above minimization problem. Respectively,
let Ψt and Ξt be the Lagrangian multiplier of equation (B.4) and (B.5). We can write
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the Lagrangian function as follows:
L(ψt, ςt, ϕt) =
∫
ψtdµ(θ
t) + ςt
+ Ψt[
∫
ϕtdµ(θ
t)− f(
∫
e∗tdµ(θ
t), K∗t+1 + ςt) + f(
∫
e∗tdµ(θ
t), K∗t+1)]
+ Ξt[
∫
Et(U
−1(
U(x∗t ) + σu(q
∗
t ) + βU(x
∗
t+1)− U(x∗t + ψt)− σu(q∗t + ϕt)
β
)
− x∗t+1)dµ(θt)− F (K∗t+1 + ςt,
∫
ht+1dµ(θ
t+1)) + F (K∗t+1,
∫
ht+1dµ(θ
t+1))
− (1− δ)ςt].
(B.8)
Since (ψt, ςt, ϕt) = 0 is the solution, we can have the following conditions:
1 = Ψ∗tfK(
∫
e∗tdµ(θ
t), K∗t+1) + Ξ
∗
t [FK(K
∗
t+1,
∫
ht+1dµ(θ
t+1)) + (1− δ)], (B.9)
Ψ∗t = Ξ
∗
tEt
σu
′
(q∗t )
βU ′(x∗t+1)
, (B.10)
1 = Ξ∗tEt
U
′
(x∗t )
βU ′(x∗t+1)
. (B.11)
Combing the above three equations, we could have:
Et
1
βU ′(x∗t+1)
=
FK(t+ 1) + 1− δ
U ′(x∗t )− σu′(q∗t )fK(t)
.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX OF SECTION 4
Proof of Proposition 4
Replacing the law of motion for net worth (4.12) into equation (4.14), the profit
maximization problem by a representative bank is given by
Nt = Et
∞∑
j=0
(1− θ)θjβjΛt,t+j[(Rlt+j −Rdt+j)dst+j +Rdt+jnt+j] (C.1)
s.t.Nt ≥ ϕdst ,
where µt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility con-
straint. By using the Lagrangian, the first oder conditions are given by
(1− θ)θβΛt,t+1(Rlt+j −Rdt+j)− µtϕ = 0. (C.2)
µt(Nt − ϕdst) = 0, µt ≥ 0. (C.3)
Since, by assumption, the premium βjΛt,t+j(R
l
t+j − Rdt+j) is positive in any period,
from equation (C.2), we know that µt > 0, thus the incentive compatibility constraint
will hold with equality, which means
Nt = ϕd
s
t . (C.4)
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Now, let’s write the Nt in a recursive form and define:
νtd
s
t = Et
∞∑
j=0
(1− θ)θjβjΛt,t+j[(Rlt+j −Rdt+j)dst+j],
ηtnt = Et
∞∑
j=0
(1− θ)θjβjΛt,t+j[Rdt+jnt+j].
(C.5)
Then,
νt = (1− θ)(Rlt −Rdt ) + Et
∞∑
j=1
(1− θ)θjβjΛt,t+j[(Rlt+j −Rdt+j)
dst+j
dst
],
ηt = (1− θ)Rdt + Et
∞∑
j=1
(1− θ)θjβjΛt,t+j[Rdt+j
nt+j
nt
].
(C.6)
Update the above equation one period further, we could have:
νt = (1− θ)(Rlt −Rdt ) + Et[θβΛt,t+1xt,t+1vt+1],
ηt = (1− θ)Rdt + Et[θβΛt,t+1zt,t+1ηt+1],
(C.7)
where xt,t+j =
dst+j
dst
and zt,t+j =
nt+j
nt
.
The firm’s optimization problem
Replace the detail expressions of related variables into the entrepreneur i’s value
function (4.28). Let χt(i) be the Lagrange multiplier of collateral constraint when
the firm can not re-optimize the price level, and χ∗t (i) is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with collateral constraint when the firm can re-optimize the price level.
The first-order conditions are
Lt(i) : [
Pt−1(i)YLt(i)
Pt
− R
l
tWt
Pt
][1 + βeEt
VM(t+ 1)
1 + pit+1
] = χt(i)R
l
tWt, (C.8)
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L∗t (i) : [
(1− 1
ε
)P ∗t (i)Y
∗
Lt(i)
Pt
− R
l
tWt
Pt
][1 + βeEt
V ∗M(t+ 1)
1 + pit+1
] = χ∗t (i)R
l
tWt, (C.9)
Kt+1(i) : −Rlt
∂It(i)
∂Kt+1(i)
+ βeEt[
VK(t+ 1)
Pt+1
− VM(t+ 1)R
l
t
1 + pit+1
∂It(i)
∂Kt+1(i)
]
= χt(i)[R
l
t
∂It(i)
∂Kt+1(i)
− ψt(i)EtQt+1(i)],
(C.10)
K∗t+1(i) : −Rlt
∂I∗t (i)
∂K∗t+1(i)
+ βeEt[
V ∗K(t+ 1)
Pt+1
− V
∗
M(t+ 1)R
l
t
1 + pit+1
∂I∗t (i)
∂K∗t+1(i)
]
= χ∗t (i)[R
l
t
∂I∗t (i)
∂K∗t+1(i)
− ψt(i)EtQ∗t+1(i)],
(C.11)
P ∗t (i) :
(1− )Y ∗t (i)
Pt
[1 + βeEt
V ∗M(t+ 1)
Pt+1
] + βeEt
VP (t+ 1)
Pt+1
= 0. (C.12)
By using the Envelop Theorem, we have:
Kt(i) :
VK(t)
Pt
= ω[(
Pt−1(i)YKt(i)
Pt
−− ∂It(i)
∂Kt(i)
Rlt)(1 + β
eEt
VM(t+ 1)
1 + pit+1
)
+ βeEt
VK(t+ 1)(1− δ)
Pt+1
] + (1− ω)[((1− ε)P
∗
t (i)Y
∗
Kt(i)
Pt
− ∂It∗(i)
∂Kt(i)
Rlt)(1 + β
eEt
V ∗M(t+ 1)
1 + pit+1
) + βeEt
V ∗K(t+ 1)(1− δ)
Pt+1
]
− [ωχt(i)ψt(i) ∂It(i)
∂Kt(i)
Rlt + (1− ω)χt(i)∗ψ∗t (i)
∂It∗(i)
∂Kt(i)
Rlt],
(C.13)
Mt(i) :
VM(t)
Pt
= ω[
Rlt
Pt
+ βeEt
VM(t+ 1)R
l
t
Pt+1
+
χt(i)R
l
t
Pt
]
+(1− ω)[R
l
t
Pt
+ βeEt
V ∗M(t+ 1)R
l
t
Pt+1
+
χ∗t (i)R
l
t
Pt
],
(C.14)
Pt−1(i) :
VP (t)
Pt
= ω[
Yt(i)
Pt
+ βeEt
VM(t+ 1)Yt(i) + VP (t+ 1)
Pt+1
]. (C.15)
Here, Vx(t) denotes the partial deviation of the value function with respect to x at
period t, V ∗x (t) denotes the partial deviation of the value function when the firm can
optimally choose the price level, YLt(i) is the marginal labor production, YKt(i) is
the marginal capital production.
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Since χt(i) ≥ 0 and χ∗t (i) ≥ 0, within equation (C.8) and (C.9), we could have
Pt−1(i)YLt(i)
Pt
≥ R
l
tWt
Pt
,
(1− 1
ε
)P ∗t (i)Y
∗
Lt(i)
Pt
≥ R
l
tWt
Pt
.
(C.16)
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Figure C.1: Stock Price and Investment’s Deviation from Trend (%).
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Figure C.2: Stock Price and GDP’s Deviation from Trend (%).
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Preferences
β 0.99 Discount rate
Ψ 1.63 Relative utility weight of labor
ε 11 Elasticity of substitution
Financial Intermediaries
ϕ 0.381 Fraction of capital that can be diverted
θ 0.972 Survival rate of bankers
 0.002 Proportional transfer to the new entering bankers
Non-financial Firms
α 0.36 Capital share in production function
ω 0.779 Probability of keeping prices fixed
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
ξ 3 Elasticity of the investment to capital ratio
Exogenous Process
ρ 0.979 Quarterly persistence of log collateral ratio shocks
ψ¯ 0.75 The average value of collateral ratio
σψ 0.0126 Standard deviation of log collateral ratio shocks
ρa 0.95 Quarterly persistence of log TFP process
σa 0.0038 Standard deviation of log TFP shock
σϕ 0.001713 Standard deviation of bankers’ diverting ratio shock
Table C.1: Parameters
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Figure C.3: Impulse Responses to a Negative Collateral Shock: Deviation from
Steady-state.
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Figure C.4: Impulse Responses to a Negative Technology Shock: Deviation from
Steady-state.
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Figure C.5: Impulse Responses to a Positive Diverting Shock: Deviation from Steady-
state.
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